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1. INTRODUCTION
Ideas for the EU to set up ‘asylum reception 
centres’ in third countries have been advanced, 
unsuccessfully, during the last 15 years. These 
have usually come from specific representatives of 
individual Member States (most often ministries 
of interior or similar ministries), and have been 
put forward without careful consideration of their 
practical repercussions or their compatibility with 
obligations under EU law and policy or with regional 
and international standards in these domains.1  
A previous proposal was put forward in 1986 by 
Denmark to the UN General Assembly, which 
suggested the setting-up of UN processing centres in 
regions of origin that would manage resettlement, 
but it failed to attract the necessary support and was 
subsequently abandoned.2 
A somewhat similar proposal was made by the 
Netherlands in 1993–94 for European processing 
centres at the Intergovernmental Consultations on 
Migration, Asylum and Refugees.3  Subsequently, a 
number of Member State representatives have (at 
different intervals) advanced various versions of 
‘offshoring’ asylum management to non-EU countries, 
i.e. Denmark (2001), the UK (2003), Germany (2014) 
and more recently France (2017).4  Austria proposed 
a model of offshore asylum processing with no 
subsequent resettlement in the EU as a key policy 
initiative for its 2018 Presidency of the Council of 
the EU.5  None of these past proposals have found 
consensus among EU Member State representatives 
or at any international and European fora.
Until now, there has not been any formal EU 
initiative for extraterritorial asylum processing. 
Indeed, the above-mentioned past ideas have usually 
originated and been framed ‘outside’ the EU, with 
rather little understanding of their actual feasibility 
or implications for the EU legal system. They have 
tended to mean ‘less EU’ in domains where there is a 
very well-developed EU legal and policy regime and 
a human rights framework to which Member States 
have to abide.
Among the similarities of past calls for extraterritorial 
asylum processing is moreover the lack of a 
common understanding of ‘what’ we are talking 
about precisely. What is new from these kinds of 
extraterritorial initiatives, in comparison with existing 
extraterritorial policies and practices for ‘migration 
control’ in the EU, is that they appear to put special 
emphasis on the need to offshore the assessment 
of asylum applications. This would entail partially 
extending or ‘externalising’ EU asylum processing 
to foreign territories – regarding the decision on the 
actual merits of an international protection claim, 
the issue of an entry visa to those receiving positive 
decisions or their resettlement in another non-EU 
country. This in turns begs new questions and poses 
profound difficulties with respect to jurisdiction, 
effectiveness and financial considerations.
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An important element of these calls to offshore 
asylum processing is the reference to models outside 
Europe. In particular, the Australian approach to 
the extraterritorial processing of asylum has been 
championed by various parties in EU Member 
States.6  This report therefore examines the 
feasibility of extraterritorial processing of asylum 
claims and external management of migration. 
It offers a comparative account of experiences of 
extraterritorialisation of asylum and migration by 
four countries: Australia, Spain, Tunisia and the US. 
We investigate the specific aspects shaping each 
of these experiences, draw ‘lessons learned’ and 
identify challenges from these examples. Finally, we 
offer some insight into whether these international 
experiences could be applied in the EU context.
1.1 NOTE ON CONCEPTS 
AND STRUCTURE
The notion of ‘offshoring asylum’ constitutes an 
empty shell in itself. There is not a commonly 
accepted understanding of what this concept means 
or entails. This report shows how this term has taken 
on different guises and features depending on the 
characteristics and background of the countries 
under assessment. A key idea behind its use is that 
the reach of ‘controls’ are extended or performed in 
the territory of third states, which has previously been 
referred to as ‘remote control’.7  The distinguishing 
quality of ‘extraterritoriality’ is that the external 
borders of the State, and the common external border 
of the EU resulting from the Schengen system, are no 
longer the venue or loci where ‘executive power’ and 
‘authority’ is supposed to take place over individuals.
This report uses the concept of extraterritorialisation,8 
which entails a matrix of strategies, practices and 
technologies encompassing the examination, 
processing and/or implementation of asylum 
and migration management (including border 
surveillance) policies before individuals’ arrival 
on the territory of the state concerned. Particular 
attention is paid to various manifestations of 
extraterritorialisation in asylum processing, and to 
those migration management practices that have 
come in conjunction with or in close relation to it. As 
noted above, this is studied in selected international 
jurisdictions – Australia, Spain, Tunisia and the US.
The notion of ‘extraterritorial processing’ generally 
applies to the area of asylum. It usually entails 
that the processing of an asylum claim takes place 
elsewhere, i.e. in the territory of third states. A 
key controversy surrounding extraterritoriality 
is that of determining ‘jurisdiction’ in cases of 
potential fundamental rights violations, and the 
‘responsibility’ of the authorities involved. This 
idea has been particularly contentious in relation to 
refugees and their access to international protection 
policies, where states have committed themselves to 
fully respect a solid body of international, regional 
and EU human rights benchmarks.
This report puts special focus on extraterritorial 
processing or offshoring of asylum claims. There 
is a need to be more specific as to what qualifies as 
‘offshoring asylum’ and what does not. Goodwin-
Gill defines this notion as “one state uses another’s 
territory, with or without the assistance of an 
international organisation, in order to decide claims 
to asylum which either have already been lodged on 
its own territory or might have been lodged there if 
the claimant had not been intercepted en route”.9  
The asylum system is in this way partially extended 
into foreign territory – which may take different 
degrees and forms – to process asylum claims.10 
This report includes other practical cases that do not 
fully comply with this working definition, but which 
present important extraterritorial or transnational 
components when thinking more generally about 
the dilemmas inherent to extraterritorial asylum 
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and migration policies, such as resettlement and 
emergency evacuation mechanisms. It addresses the 
following question: Is the extraterritorial processing 
of asylum feasible in the EU or does it entail ever more 
profound challenges?
The notions of ‘feasibility’ or ‘success’ for the 
purposes of our investigation take into account 
both the effectiveness and the compliance of 
extraterritorialisation with fundamental rights and 
the rule of law. The scope of the ‘effectiveness’ test 
not only covers the extent to which the explicit/
implicit public goals of these policies and initiatives 
have been duly met, but also their actual societal 
effects and compatibility with fundamental rights 
and rule of law obligations.11 
The report is structured as follows: Section 2 
provides a detailed examination of previous and 
current policies, practices or initiatives that are 
involved in the extraterritorialisation of asylum 
processing and migration management in the 
four selected countries. Specific attention is given 
to the scope and nature of these initiatives, their 
effectiveness, practical and societal repercussions 
and fundamental rights implications. Section 3 
highlights a number of challenges and insights 
from the four case studies. Section 4 examines the 
lessons learned and their applicability and feasibility 
within the EU context. Section 5 concludes by giving 
substance to the notions of portable responsibility 
and portable justice, and the ways in which they show 
far-reaching potential in capturing responsibility 
for human rights violations in the context of 
extraterritorial processing of asylum and migration 
management. For readers interested in the EU 
legal and institutional landscape for such policies, 
Appendix II provides a substantive description.
2.  COMPARATIVE 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCES
2.1 AUSTRALIA 12 
Key findings and lessons learned
Since 2001, Australia has operationalised its ‘Pacific Plans’ of interdictions at sea, 
thereby preventing asylum seekers from reaching Australian territory. These operations 
have involved taking interdicted asylum seekers to regional processing centres (RPCs) in 
Nauru, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Christmas Island for processing their asylum claims. 
Since 2013, however, under the Pacific Plan II even successful claimants of international 
protection in these RPCs have been permanently denied the opportunity to settle in 
Australia.
Both Pacific Plans have been subject to concerns about human rights violations. Under 
Pacific Plan I, concerns about the harsh physical conditions in the RPCs, mental health 
impacts of prolonged detention and uncertainty about future prospects, the standard 
of healthcare provided and procedural deficits (such as the lack of the right to legal 
representation and lack of clarity as to the existence of channels for independent review), 
have been identified as key human rights concerns.
Similar human rights issues have been identified in respect of Pacific Plan II. In 
particular, the inadequate and unhygienic living conditions (including lack of security and 
privacy), instances of sexual and physical abuse by RPC staff, inadequate medical and 
psychological treatment, failure to treat detainees with dignity and respect for their right 
to seek asylum, and failure to respect the rights and best interests of children have been 
identified as human rights challenges in the RPCs under Pacific Plan II.
9
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Notably, these Pacific Plans and the responsibilities for asylum seekers are based on Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoUs) between Australia and the Republic of Nauru and PNG respectively. 
Under these MoUs and Administrative Arrangements, the management and security of RPCs are 
contracted and subcontracted to private parties. The legal standards and judicial safeguards 
under Pacific Plan II are disengaged under the MoUs and placed under the responsibility of 
Nauru and PNG. The provision of healthcare at the RPCs has similarly been placed outside 
the responsibility of the Australian government, as this healthcare service comes under the 
responsibility of the International Health and Medical Services (IHMS).
In 2013 the Australian government operationalised the Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) 
initiative, whereby military resources are employed to enforce the closure of the Australian 
mainland to asylum seekers. Under OSB, the Australian government conducts turn-backs 
(removing vessels from Australian waters and returning them to just outside the territorial waters 
of the country of departure, i.e. tow-backs) and takebacks (returning crew and passengers 
interdicted at sea). OSB has particularly been challenged as a clear example of direct and indirect 
refoulement in contravention of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
No evidence has been found for the effectiveness of the Australian model of extraterritorial 
asylum processing in the reduction of migration flows deviating from the global trend. Any 
perceived increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving in Australia has coincided with 
the global trends identified by organisations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) as a response to, for instance, the Syrian refugee crisis and the movement of the 
Rohingya people from Myanmar.
2.1.1 Practices
The visa regime under the Migration Act 
1958 (Cth)
Australia’s experience with refugee ‘boat people’, 
which began with the Indo-China refugee crisis in 
the 1970s and 1980s, has shaped its policies and 
approaches to refugees, including a preference 
for offshore resettlement of refugees and its 
demonization of ‘spontaneous’ boat arrivals. 
Officially recognised in 1996, the resettlement 
programme for refugees operates through the 
Humanitarian Programme, which has been 
consistently capped at between 12,000 to 13,750 
places since 1996.
Under the Humanitarian Programme the number of 
places available to offshore applicants is linked to the 
number granted onshore. The Minister responsible 
for immigration has the power to ‘cap’ the number 
of onshore visas granted.13  Between 1996 and 2003, 
10,000 places were notionally allocated for offshore 
resettlement and 2,000 for onshore asylum seekers.14 
In the 2015–16 period, 11,762 places were allocated to 
offshore applicants (mainly from Iraq and Syria) and 
2,003 places for onshore asylum seekers.15 
Decisions about the outcome of visa applications 
under the Humanitarian Programme are made by the 
Department of Immigration, sometimes relying on 
UNHCR assessments. The Australian government 
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decides the size and regional composition of the 
programme annually, taking into consideration 
advice from the UNHCR on global resettlement 
needs and priorities and Australia’s capacity to 
provide settlement support services.16 
Australia controls the entry of all persons through 
a visa regime established under the Australian 
Migration Act 1958.17  There is no dedicated visa 
for refugees and asylum seekers, who must obtain 
another class of visa (such as a tourist, visitor or 
student visa) to be admitted as ‘lawful non-citizens’ 
and to apply for asylum in Australia. Because of 
Australia’s isolated geographical position and its 
ability to control its borders, it does not experience 
‘mixed flows’ of asylum seekers and illegal workers, 
and the greater proportion of ‘boat people’ are found 
to be ‘genuine’ refugees.
In the period leading up to 2001 (Pacific Plan 
I operated in 2001–07), Australia introduced 
new policies intended to deter the movement of 
‘spontaneous’ asylum seekers to Australia. These 
were mainly persons moving by boat from the Middle 
East via Indonesia and Malaysia. The policies were 
mandatory detention of ‘unlawful non-citizens’ 
and the introduction of a temporary protection visa. 
These policies and the pattern of ‘spontaneous’ 
asylum seekers’ movement are largely unchanged.
Only ‘lawful non-citizens’ (visa-ed) asylum seekers in 
Australia are eligible for a permanent protection visa, 
which is a pre-condition to applying for citizen status. 
Under legislation introduced in 2013, no asylum seeker 
without a valid visa can make a claim for protection in 
Australia, under the Australian legal system.
Interdictions of boats at sea and transfers of 
asylum seekers to offshore processing centres 
or to Christmas Island
Australia has instigated two Pacific Plans, both 
involving agreements with the Nauru and PNG as 
sites for offshore processing centres. Under Pacific 
Plan I (2001–07), asylum seekers interdicted at 
sea were transferred to Nauru and Manus Island. 
Some other groups of asylum seekers were taken to 
Christmas Island, which is Australian territory close 
to Indonesia, during this period.18 
The second Pacific Plan has operated from 2012 to 
the present time. The RPC on Manus Island in PNG 
is currently being wound down following the decision 
of the PNG Supreme Court of Justice in Namah v 
State of PNG,19  which declared that the detention of 
asylum seekers on Manus Island was unlawful as it 
breaches the guarantee of personal liberty in s42 of 
the PNG Constitution.
Under both Pacific Plans maritime interdictions 
by Australian officials of boats of asylum seekers 
have been conducted. They were initially carried 
out by the Australian Navy under Operation Relex 
(2001–07). Currently they are supported by the 
OSB initiative introduced in September 2013. The 
practices of interdiction raise questions about 
consistency and compliance with international law, 
refugee law and the law of the sea, including the duty 
to rescue.20  During Operation Relex a number of 
deaths occurred at sea in the course of interdiction 
operations.21  At least three ships were known to have 
been turned back during this period.22 
Transfers of asylum seekers from RPCs to 
the Australian mainland (and vice versa)
To enable offshore processing, the Australian 
government also transfers some selected and 
selected categories of ‘non-visa-ed’ asylum seekers 
who arrive in Australia to RPCs and Christmas Island 
and vice versa. Starting on 13 August 2012, asylum 
seekers without a valid visa who arrived in Australia 
by boat (or who were intercepted at sea and brought 
to Australia) were transferred to ‘offshore processing’ 
in the RPCs on Nauru and on Manus Island in PNG, 
although some were sent to the Australian mainland 
and some to Christmas Island.
Asylum seekers who are or have been subject to 
offshore processing since 2012 are divided into two 
cohorts of people, depending on when they arrived in 
Australia and the agreements that were in place with 
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Nauru and PNG at that time. Asylum seekers who 
arrived in Australia by boat between 13 August 2012 
and 18 July 2013 were the first cohort of people. Some 
were sent offshore to Nauru and PNG, while others 
remained in Australia. More than 600 asylum seekers 
were sent to Nauru and more than 350 to PNG during 
this period. No one transferred offshore in this cohort 
ever completed the refugee status determination 
(RSD) process there or received an outcome. After 
19 July 2013, everyone in this cohort who was still 
offshore began to be brought back to Australia, where 
they were required to wait extended periods of time 
(either in the community or in detention) before 
being permitted to lodge fresh claims for asylum. 
This group, termed the ‘Legacy Caseload’ is now 
subject to a simplified ‘fast-track’ RSD in Australia.23 
Asylum seekers who arrived in Australia by boat on 
or after 19 July 2013 comprise the second cohort of 
people. They were subject to a new policy, under 
which they were all sent offshore for processing in 
either Nauru or PNG and permanently denied the 
opportunity to settle in Australia. Under the terms 
of the MoU with Nauru, they were expected to be 
settled temporarily in Nauru (for up to 10 years) if 
found to be refugees, and in the case of PNG there 
was agreement that they could settle locally. No new 
asylum seekers have been transferred from Australia 
to PNG or Nauru since 2014. All new asylum seekers 
trying to reach Australia by boat since this time have 
instead been interdicted and turned back at sea or 
otherwise returned to their countries of origin.24 
Operation Sovereign Borders initiative 
– Turn-backs and tow-backs of asylum 
seekers’ boats ( from September 2013)
OSB is “a military-led inter-agency border security 
initiative which incorporates offshore processing, 
activities to disrupt and deter people smuggling, and 
interception of boats. Under OSB the government’s 
policy is to turn back boats ‘where it is safe to do 
so’”.25  Few details are publicly available regarding 
the conduct of turn-back operations due to the 
government’s policy of secrecy about ‘on-water 
operations’.
However, the Australian government releases some 
data through monthly updates.26  A distinction is 
made between turn-backs, where a vessel is removed 
from Australian waters and returned to just outside 
the territorial seas of the country from which it 
departed (tow-backs), and takebacks, which involve 
the return of crew and passengers. Interdiction at sea 
under OSB is regulated by the Maritime Powers Act 
2013 (Cth).27  It takes place in both the territorial sea 
and in the contiguous zone as well as in the high seas.
Resettlement to Australia throughout the 
implementation of the Pacific Plans
Between 2001 and September 2003, a total of 1,544 
asylum seekers (mostly from Afghanistan and Iraq) 
were detained under Pacific Plan I, with a peak 
population of 1,515 in February 2002. By September 
2003 there were only 335 asylum seekers remaining 
on Nauru and none remaining on Manus Island. A 
ministerial press release in February 2008 said that a 
total of 1,637 people had been detained in the Nauru 
and Manus RPCs between 2001 and 2008, including 
786 Afghans, 684 Iraqis and 88 Sri Lankans. It revealed 
that 70% were resettled to Australia or other countries, 
including New Zealand and Sweden. Of those, around 
61% (705 people) were resettled in Australia.28 
Under Pacific Plan I, the UNHCR refused to process 
the asylum seekers on Nauru, and the procedures did 
not include a right to external review.29 
Under Pacific Plan II, New Zealand has offered to 
resettle a small number of refugees from PNG and/
or Nauru, but to date Australia has refused to accept 
the offer. A small number of refugees on Nauru 
were relocated to Cambodia (6 in total) under an 
agreement with the Australian government but most 
have subsequently left Cambodia.30  In late 2015, a 
resettlement deal was announced with the US.31  The 
US has agreed to take up to 1,200 refugees and to 
date about 300 refugees have been moved to the US 
from Manus Island and Nauru. 
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2.1.2 Human rights implications
Nauru is the world’s smallest island nation, stretching 
to just 21 square km, some 3,000 km north east of 
Cairns on Australia’s east coast in the Pacific Ocean. 
It has a population of about 10,000. Due to the 
lack of arable land for agriculture, the degradation 
of land, coastal and marine resources, and water 
contamination and scarcity, the island faces serious 
food and water insecurity and is dependent on 
foreign imports.32 
Papua New Guinea is an independent Pacific nation, 
north of Australia across the Torres Strait, with a 
population of around 7.3 million people; 600 islands 
make up its 463,000 square km. Manus Island, a 
former World War II naval base is 350 km from the 
PNG mainland and 800 km north of the PNG capital 
of Pt Moresby.
Both countries are now Parties to the Refugee 
Convention. Nauru has signed but not ratified the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
whereas PNG is a Party to both Conventions and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Unlike PNG, Nauru is a Party to the 
Convention against Torture.
Pacific Solution I (2001–07)
Under Pacific Plan I, the asylum seekers were 
denied the right to seek asylum in Australia and 
instead were sent to Nauru and Manus Island, PNG. 
By 2006 the human rights implications of Pacific 
Solution or ‘Plan’ I had become clear. Concerns 
centred on the harsh physical conditions in the 
RPCs, the mental health impacts of prolonged 
detention and uncertainty as to future prospects, as 
well as processing issues.33  Additionally, there were 
concerns about the level of healthcare provided, 
and the rights of children, especially in relation to 
education.
In human rights and international refugee law, the 
implications fall under i) arbitrary detention (ICCPR, 
Article 9) and a breach of Article 31 of the Refugee 
Convention (non-penalisation for method of arrival); 
ii) constructive refoulement (that is, effective denial 
of a hearing through inadequate processing – Article 
33 of the Refugee Convention); and iii) freedom 
from discrimination (Refugee Convention, Article 
3).34  Refugees resettled in Australia under temporary 
protection visas were denied family reunion and their 
freedom of movement was restricted. They were 
denied certain basic services to which other refugees 
and entrants were entitled.35 
Pacific Solution II (2012 to the present)
Similar issues have been raised in numerous reports 
relating to Pacific Solution II.36  The issues arise 
largely from the fact that asylum seekers are held on 
remote tropical islands, where the capacity to care 
for them in decent and humane conditions cannot be 
guaranteed. A number of the issues are exacerbated 
by the administrative arrangements in place for daily 
management of the RPCs. They can be clustered as 
follows:
• inadequate and unhygienic living conditions, 
including lack of security and privacy in the RPCs;
• abuse, including sexual assaults and physical 
abuse by RPC staff;
• inadequate medical and psychological treatment;
• failure to treat detainees with dignity and respect 
for their right to seek asylum; and
• failure to respect the rights and the best interests 
of children.
Offshore processing in RPCs
–  MoUs with the Republic of Nauru and PNG
Australia’s Pacific Plan I (2001–07) or the ‘Pacific 
Solution’ or ‘Pacific Strategy’, arose from the arrival 
of the Norwegian-registered container ship, the MV 
Tampa, with a cargo of 433 asylum seekers travelling 
from Indonesia, off Christmas Island in late August 
2001. The Australian government refused to allow 
the asylum seekers to land, and made agreements 
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with New Zealand, Nauru and PNG to transfer the 
asylum seekers to their territories for processing. On 
Nauru, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) had responsibility for the management and 
administration of the sites. Camp security was 
managed by a private company, Chubb Protection 
Services, based on a protocol made between 
the Nauru Police Force, the IOM and Australian 
Protective Service. Under this arrangement, the 
officers of the Australian Protective Service were 
appointed reserve officers of the Nauru Police Force.
Although the Australian government funded and 
directed the Pacific ‘protection’ centres (as the 
Australian government described RPCs), there was 
little protection for asylum seekers under local laws,37 
and a lack of transparency about the conditions of 
detainees. The Australian government basically 
managed and controlled the destinies of the asylum 
seekers, while leaving them in the care of others.38 
This model has been replicated under Pacific Plan II 
(2012 to the present). Current arrangements between 
Australia and PNG and Nauru arise from three MoUs 
of August and September 2012 and August 2013, 
and a Regional Resettlement Arrangement. Under 
the terms of the MoUs Australia agreed to bear all 
the costs for establishing ‘processing centres’. The 
detail of implementation of the MoUs, which began 
to trickle out in various reports following complaints 
and incidents, was discussed in the High Court 
decision of Plaintiff M68/2015.39 
–  Arrangements under the MoUs for the delivery 
of care and services
The RPCs are managed by a series of contracts and 
subcontracts with the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection, which has directly contracted 
with Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd 
(‘Transfield’) as a service provider. On Nauru, from 
March 2014 Transfield undertook to provide ‘garrison 
and welfare services’ to transferees and personnel at 
the regional processing centres. ‘Garrison services’ 
include security, cleaning and catering services. 
As a service provider, Transfield was required to 
ensure that the security of the perimeter of the site 
was maintained. The Department provided fencing, 
lighting towers and other security infrastructure. 
Transfield in turn subcontracted with Wilson Security 
Pty Ltd (‘Wilson Security’) to monitor ingress and 
egress to the RPC.40 
On Nauru, the Australian government agreed to 
engage and fund contractors to assist with the 
refugee status assessment process. The relevant 
determinations are made pursuant to Nauruan law, 
and Nauru is required to provide access to a merits 
review, which is funded by Australia.41  Further, 
the MoU and the Administrative Arrangements 
provide for the establishment of a Joint Committee, 
cochaired by representatives from the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection and Nauru, 
which is responsible for overseeing the practical 
arrangements to implement the MoU.42 
The delivery of healthcare services for asylum 
seekers on Nauru and Manus Island is governed 
by heads of the Agreement between the Australian 
government (represented by the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection) and the 
International Health and Medical Services (IHMS). 
The IHMS is required to provide ‘primary level 
healthcare’ to asylum seekers and to establish a 
network of healthcare providers on Nauru and 
Manus Island. The IHMS works with local healthcare 
providers for emergency and acute care.
This is a challenging environment for healthcare 
workers both physically and professionally. Riots, 
violence, abuse, self-harm and a number of deaths 
have been reported in offshore centres.43  A number 
of reports raise serious concerns about the quality 
of medical care provided and whether healthcare 
professionals have been able to fulfil their professional 
and ethical obligations to patients in RPC facilities.44  
The death of Hamid Kehazaei from an untreated 
skin infection in 2015 illustrated the risk that medical 
recommendations for treatment may be ignored.45 
Official reports also detail the lack of control by the 
Australian government of the daily conditions in the 
RPCs, and breach of its duty of care to the detainees. 
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Parliament’s 2015 report46  was specifically concerned 
with numerous allegations regarding the treatment of 
asylum seekers and refugees, through the conduct of 
employees of Transfield and Wilson Security. These 
included allegations of sexual and physical abuse.47 
–  Processing of claims for refugee status in Nauru 
and PNG
Under Pacific Plan I, it was intended that the 1,550 
asylum seekers on Nauru and Manus Island would 
be processed within six months of their arrival. 
Australian immigration officials conducted RSD 
using ‘UNHCR standards’, rather than those 
operating on mainland Australia. It was reported 
that they relied almost wholly on oral submissions – 
that there was no right to legal representation, and 
lawyers were repeatedly denied access to potential 
clients, contrary to s5(2) of the Nauruan Constitution 
(which provides that each person has the right “to 
consult in the place in which he [sic] is detained a 
legal representative of his own choice”). In the case 
of negative determinations, decisions were reviewed 
by a senior officer (that is, there was solely an internal 
review).48  In addition to evidence of constructive 
refoulement, there were direct refoulements and forced 
repatriations.49 
Pacific Plan II – processing on Manus Island. 
Although 1,300 asylum seekers were transferred to 
Manus Island between July 2013 and December 2014, 
the first RSD decision was not made (by Australian 
Immigration Department officers seconded to PNG) 
until late April 2014.50  The delay in commencing 
RSD was a key factor behind the tensions that led 
to the riot in the RPC in February 2014 in which one 
asylum seeker was killed.
PNG is a Party to the Refugee Convention (although 
it has made a number of significant reservations), but 
it did not have an RSD process in place or the national 
laws until November 2014. The first refugees were 
recognised in January 2015 and permitted to leave the 
RPC. By December 2016, 1,015 RSD assessments had 
been made, of which roughly 50/50% were positive/
negative. Such assessments are made applying 
UNHCR standards using the UNHCR Handbook.51  
Yet, the UNHCR has expressed great concern about 
the capacity of PNG to conduct quality RSD and has 
produced numerous reports and statements on the 
issue. Following the Namah decision in October 2016, 
the Manus Island RPC was closed.
Pacific Plan II – processing on Nauru. By contrast 
with PNG, Nauru has established a formal RSD 
system. It acceded to the Refugee Convention in 
2011 and in 2012 it passed the Refugee Convention 
Act, which adopts the Convention definition (unlike 
PNG).52  It has established the Nauruan Secretary 
for Justice and Border Control and a Refugee 
Status Review Tribunal, and has created its own 
RSD Handbook.53  The first group of refugees were 
recognised in May 2014.
–  Summary of reports on the conditions and 
circumstances of asylum seekers in RPCs
A number of enquiries have been conducted and 
reports issued on conditions in the RPCs.54  The 
chief findings of these reports are the lack of 
transparency about conditions and operations in the 
RPCs, the lack of capacity of the local governments 
to handle the situation of large numbers of unhappy 
asylum seekers in their midst, and the failure of 
the Australian government to acknowledge its 
responsibility and duty of care to those detained 
against their will in the RPCs. In addition to 
complaints about conditions, the lack of security in 
the RPCs and the conduct of staff, the mental health 
issues caused by the lack of durable solutions is 
endemic.
Turn-backs and tow-backs of asylum 
seekers’ boats: Claims of direct and indirect 
refoulement
Australia has practised turn-back and tow-back 
policies of dubious legality under international 
law.55  Boats are known to have been turned back 
to the edge of and into Indonesian waters under 
OSB.56  Takebacks are known to have occurred in 
consultation with the governments of Sri Lanka and 
Vietnam, and concerns have been raised about the 
fate of the returned asylum seekers at the hands of 
16
Offshoring asylum and migration in Australia, Spain, Tunisia and the US
their governments.57  These processes raise concerns 
about direct and indirect refoulement. Additionally, 
there is evidence of constructive refoulement.58 
The Minasa Bone incident of 2003 and other turn-
backs59  provide evidence of indirect or ‘chain’ 
refoulement as the asylum seekers were returned 
to Indonesia. In the course of interceptions and 
tow-backs, an ‘enhanced screening’ process that 
was introduced in October 2012 raises considerable 
concerns about the nature and quality of the 
process and whether individualised assessments of 
protection needs are being identified.60  No post-
return monitoring is conducted in such cases.61 
2.1.3 Effectiveness in reducing 
migration flows
Under Pacific Plan I the majority of the ‘boat people’ 
were part of the ‘Afghan diaspora’ of 2001, when an 
estimated 900,000 people fled Afghanistan.62  At 
that time the number of asylum seekers intending 
to reach Australia was neither disproportionate to 
the contemporary global movements, nor did it 
represent a big shift in the numbers moving. The 
change in movements that Australia experienced in 
the period leading up to the 2001 MV Tampa incident 
was in the mode of arrival (as well as the nationality 
of the asylum seekers). Up to that point, most 
asylum seekers intending to seek asylum in Australia 
travelled by air. In fact, the number of boat arrivals 
had decreased in the period up to July 2001.63 
Similarly, although the number of asylum seekers 
seeking entry to Australia decreased from 2005 
onwards,64  this was consistent with global trends.65  
In 2009 when the number of refugees worldwide 
increased, so did the number seeking to enter 
Australia by boat.66
For Pacific Plan II (2012 to the present) the increase 
in the number of asylum seekers attempting to 
reach Australia from 2012 coincided with the Syrian 
refugee crisis. From 2013, asylum seeker applications 
increased globally by 18%, with the largest number 
being Syrians.67  Within the region to the north 
of Australia, a parallel crisis became evident in 
early 2015 with the departure of the Rohingya boat 
people from Myanmar to Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia.68  The UNHCR Fact Sheet for South-East 
Asia dated September 2014 records an estimated 
20,000 ‘irregular migrant’ departures by sea in 2014 
in the region.69  The UNHCR estimates that 500,000 
refugees from different ethnic groups have been 
fleeing for several decades in search of protection 
from ethnic conflict and violence.70  In early April 
2017, the Minister for Immigration advised that 
30 boats (carrying about 765 people) had been 
intercepted since the beginning of OSB (in 2013).71 
2.1.4 Impact on intra-regional 
mobility
Australian policy on refugees reaches into and 
influences other countries in the region. To deter 
secondary movements, Australia refuses to resettle 
refugees from Indonesia.72  This has a knock-on effect 
on the capacity of the UNHCR to provide assistance 
to refugees in Indonesia: it has left approximately 
14,000 refugees stranded in Indonesia with 
limited opportunities for a ‘durable solution’ and 
pushed destitute refugees into Australia-funded, 
IOM-managed detention centres. Within the 
region, Thailand and Malaysia are hosting much 
larger numbers of refugees and asylum seekers 
(approximately 156,000 and 148,000 respectively). 
It is reported that 94% of movements to these two 
countries are from Myanmar.
Cambodia, which is a signatory to the Refugee 
Convention, was singled out by the Australian 
government as a potential party to an MoU following 
the failed Malaysia swap arrangement of 2011, and 
in order to take some pressure off the Nauru/Manus 
Island situation. Cambodia was provided with 
A$40 million in ‘development aid’ and A$15 million 
for a resettlement programme. In all, 6 refugees 
accepted the offer and it is believed that 2 remain 
in Cambodia.73  Meanwhile, Cambodia is known 
to have forcibly returned refugees from minority 
populations to neighbouring countries.
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2.2 SPAIN 74 
Key findings and lessons learned
The arrival of a large number of persons to the Canary Islands in 2005–06 (termed the 
‘cayuco crisis’) led to an increase in Spanish efforts to cooperate with African countries 
towards the reduction of migratory flows. Spain’s policies focus on three pillars of 
dissuasion, i.e. preventive, coercive and repressive dissuasion. Spain increased its bilateral 
cooperation with Mauritania in its efforts to reduce migratory flows, leading inter alia to 
the establishment of the Migrant Reception Centre in Nouadhibou in April 2006.
The Nouadhibou centre – referred to by Spanish and Mauritanian authorities as a Migrant 
Reception Centre and by the Red Cross as a Centre for Temporary Stay of Immigrants – 
worked in practice as a detention or internment centre for migrants returned from Spain 
or detained in transit in Mauritania. The centre was heavily criticised, with a number of 
reports noting that it did not meet the minimum conditions for guaranteeing adequate 
treatment.
The Nouadhibou centre and the activities of the Spanish and Mauritanian authorities have 
further been subject to concerns about their human rights implications. These include the 
lack of any legal process for the persons detained, arbitrary arrests and the deportation of 
migrants returned from Spain or detained in Mauritania to Mali and Senegal without a legal 
basis and or any form of judicial review.
In terms of the ‘effectiveness’ of the Spanish policies in reducing irregular arrivals, the 
available statistical data note a reduction of the volume of arrivals since 2007 to the 
Canary Islands. However, the specific impacts of the Nouadhibou centre in this reduction 
of arrivals is difficult to separate from Spain’s multi-layered strategy to contain irregular 
flows in cooperation with African countries. There are some indicia that the reduction 
of migratory flows to the Canary Islands may have merely diverted these flows eastward 
towards other routes, including the Western Mediterranean route and the land route 
through Ceuta and Melilla.
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2.2.1 Introduction
Spain’s maritime border has a total length of 4,964 
km. There are three main arrival points used by 
irregular immigrants to reach Spanish shores: the 
autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, the Strait 
of Gibraltar and the Canary Islands. The first boats 
with irregular immigrants started to arrive across 
the Strait of Gibraltar at the end of the 1980s. From 
small wooden boats (pateras) with mostly Moroccan 
immigrants on-board, arrivals took place first in the 
Andalusian provinces closest to Morocco and later in 
provinces located farther away.75 
From 2000 to 2008, arrivals increased substantially 
and the main route shifted from the Strait of Gibraltar 
and the Alboran Sea (the Western Mediterranean 
route) to the Atlantic (the West African route). 
Between 1995 and 2004, boats launched from the 
southern regions of Morocco arrived in the Canary 
archipelago. By the end of 2005, this corridor had 
shifted, with most boats departing from the coasts of 
Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Conakry and Mauritania. 
The boats (now called cayucos) increased in size 
and the number of immigrants on-board, mostly 
coming from Sub-Saharan countries. This shift was 
accompanied by a surge in the number of arrivals: 
whereas 4,718 people landed in the Canary Islands in 
2005, this number rose to more than 30,000 in 2006, 
representing 81% of all maritime arrivals intercepted 
by Spain that year. This peak in the number of 
arrivals came to be known as the ‘cayuco crisis’.
After 2006, the West African route gradually 
diminished in terms of volume, though it remained 
the main route until 2008. By 2010, the Canary 
Islands accounted for 11% of all arrivals in Spain but 
by 2012 this percentage had diminished to 5%.76  In 
2012, the Spanish government stated that the West 
African route was almost inactive. Since then, the 
Western Mediterranean route has been the main 
point of entry, although with smaller volumes than 
were observed in the mid-2000s. As discussed in this 
report, migration flows in the three main migration 
routes to Spain have been directly linked to a broad 
spectrum of border control measures.
2.2.2 Policies to contain flows
Gradual implementation over time 
and space
The changes in Spain’s immigration policies since 
the 1990s can be summed up as narrowing the 
legal channels and reducing the permissiveness of 
illegal immigration.77  On the one hand, changes 
in Spain’s visa policy with regard to African 
countries contributed to reducing the chances of 
legal migration. This gradual closure took place 
during a period of economic expansion, with strong 
employment growth in areas of low productivity and 
a high degree of informality. On the other hand, the 
‘fight against irregular migration’, as it was called by 
the Ministry of Interior, developed fast with i) the 
build-up of barrier technology at land borders; ii) the 
expansion of surveillance, detection and interception 
at maritime borders; iii) the detection of (potential) 
departures from transit countries, particularly along 
the African coast; and iv) the identification and 
return of migrants intercepted in Spain.
These changes took place over several stages of an 
incremental border-control process. The first stage, 
which lasted until 2000, was characterised by the 
gradual sealing-off of the land and maritime borders 
at Ceuta and Melilla. From 2000 to 2005, efforts 
focused on the Strait of Gibraltar. This maritime 
border was sealed through the implementation of 
the Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE), 
a radar-based system for intercepting and detecting 
maritime crossings. The SIVE became one of the 
most effective mechanisms to control maritime 
irregular immigration in the Strait of Gibraltar. From 
2006 to 2009, a new set of measures focused on 
the Atlantic route, combining the expansion of the 
SIVE to the Canary Islands and the monitoring of the 
African coast. Finally, from 2009 onwards, attention 
refocused on the Mediterranean route, particularly 
Ceuta and Melilla.78 
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Policies towards Africa
Since the cayuco crisis in 2006, migration control 
policies have been among the key priorities of 
Spain’s political agenda on external affairs. In this 
context, Spain has signed bilateral agreements and 
implemented operational initiatives with African 
countries with the triple aim of discouraging 
potential immigrants from migrating (preventive 
dissuasion), controlling and containing irregular 
immigrants in transit or at the Spanish external 
borders (coercive dissuasion), and controlling and 
preventing irregular immigrants from settling down 
once in Spain (repressive dissuasion).79 
Among the most important preventive measures 
has been Spain’s development of ‘publicity and 
information campaigns’ providing information 
about the dangers involved in irregular immigration. 
Since 2007, a series of initiatives has also been 
implemented linked to Spain’s agenda on 
cooperation, which has reorganised its priorities 
towards Africa with the so-called African Plan.80  
Actions pertaining to coercive dissuasion have been 
articulated via two instruments, based on the formal 
collaboration between Spanish authorities and 
the Moroccan and Mauritanian police forces: the 
creation of binational coordination commissions on 
immigration and the deployment of joint surveillance 
patrols at sea. Since 2007, surveillance of maritime 
migration routes to Spain has also been carried 
out through multilateral initiatives, including the 
Frontex operations Hera and Indalo. As part of these 
initiatives, the testing and use of the latest generation 
technology has been considered a strategic factor to 
achieve what has been defined by some interlocutors 
as a “definitive blockade”.81 
In the deployment of these policies, the protection 
of asylum seekers has been neglected. As a 
consequence of the social and political ‘construction’ 
of African irregular migration as a paradigm 
of economically motivated flows, no specific 
mechanisms are in place to guarantee the rights 
and protection of potential asylum seekers detected 
on the routes to Spain or at the external maritime 
borders. As was mentioned in a report published 
by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 
“asylum applications are usually not formally 
registered during the identification interview 
but a later stage, after the person is transferred 
to a pre-removal detention facility or a reception 
facility for asylum seekers. Spain generally gives no 
information on asylum during the short identification 
interview after disembarkation.”82 
Finally, apart from internal control within Spanish 
territory, repressive dissuasion measures include 
readmission agreements with transit and origin 
countries. The first agreement was in 1992 with 
Morocco, followed in 2003 by the agreement with 
Mauritania and in 2006 by those with Guinea-
Bissau, Guinea-Conakry and Senegal. The effective 
application of the agreements with Morocco and 
Mauritania, the main transit countries for African 
immigration and the only two that include in 
their agreements the expulsion of third-country 
nationals, has been a key aspect in reducing irregular 
migration. Moreover, in the case of Morocco, in 
2005 a ‘rapid return system’ for Moroccan citizens 
requiring only an administrative procedure was 
activated. In all, these measures have deeply 
worried national and international human rights 
organisations, because not only have significant 
irregularities been observed, but also in practice 
these measures have hindered the guarantee of 
international protection.83 
Cooperation with Mauritania
Substantial cooperation between Spain and 
Mauritania began with the immigration agreement 
signed by the two countries in July 2003. This 
agreement allowed Spain to request Mauritania to 
readmit not only its nationals but also those citizens 
of third countries presumed to have attempted to 
reach Spain from the Mauritanian coast. In 2006, in 
the midst of the cayuco crisis, Spain and Mauritania 
signed another cooperation agreement to carry out 
joint surveillance operations of the Mauritanian 
coastline.
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It is in the context of these agreements that we must 
understand the creation of a Migrant Reception 
Centre in Nouadhibou in April 2006. The centre 
was located in a former school and restored by 
members of the Spanish army with funding from 
the Spanish Agency for International Development 
Cooperation (AECID). The centre remained under 
the management of the Mauritanian authorities 
but the Spanish Red Cross and the Mauritanian 
Red Crescent took charge of the humanitarian aid 
programme.
According to a report issued by the Red Cross 
in 2009, the humanitarian aid had three axes: i) 
receiving the migrants, with food and non-food aid 
(such as the distribution of a kit including basic needs 
items); ii) healthcare, with the presence of a nursing 
service and hospital referral if necessary; and iii) the 
reestablishment of family ties, with the possibility 
of making telephone calls to family members, and 
psychological support.84 
The Spanish and Mauritanian authorities called 
the centre in Nouadhibou a Migrant Reception 
Centre, while the Red Cross report referred to it as 
a Centre for Temporary Stay of Immigrants (CETI). 
Nevertheless, the Nouadhibou centre worked, 
fundamentally, as a detention or internment centre 
for immigrants returned from Spain as part of the 
removal process or detained in Mauritania as they 
allegedly attempted to set off in an irregular manner 
for Spain. In reference to the conditions at the 
centre, the inhabitants of Nouadhibou and later the 
Spanish press called it ‘Guantanamito’. It is true that 
internment tended to be for a very short period of 
time. According to the Mauritanian authorities, the 
centre was designed for stays of between 3 and 15 
days, with the aim of carrying out repatriations more 
quickly. But it is also true, as discussed in the next 
section, that the conditions were not those expected 
of a reception centre for immigrants.
2.2.3 Human rights implications
Extra-legal process. The intention to migrate 
to a third country was not considered an offence 
under Mauritanian law. As a result, there were no 
regulated procedures or administrative resolutions 
for determining how to go about the repatriation 
of immigrants. As detention was not subject to 
any control by the judicial authorities, the people 
detained did not have access to legal assistance 
or interpreters, or the possibility of appealing the 
internment decision. A maximum detention period 
was also not stipulated.85  According to the Spanish 
Commission for Refugees (CEAR), the Nouadhibou 
centre also lacked a legal foundation.
Arbitrary arrests. Reports by Amnesty 
International, CEAR and the Red Cross all note 
arbitrary arrests in streets and homes where there was 
no sign of people preparing to emigrate to Europe. 
The arbitrary nature of these arrests was condemned 
by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
which, after its visit to Mauritania in 2008, denounced 
detentions without relevant court orders and even 
the detention of people whose documentation 
was in order.86  These arbitrary arrests seem to 
suggest that the agreement with Spain had the 
effect of increasing internal control and securitising 
immigration, extending far beyond the border areas 
and those proposing to depart for Spain. Considering 
that Mauritania was not only a transit country, but 
also one of immigration (in 2008 it was calculated 
that a million immigrants lived in Mauritania), this 
increased internal control also affected those who 
habitually lived there. The Amnesty International 
report additionally denounced cases of abuse, theft 
and extortion during the detention.87 
Inadequate conditions. Immigrants, social 
organisations, government officials and authorities 
responsible for custody all noted that the 
Nouadhibou centre did not meet the minimum 
conditions for guaranteeing adequate treatment.88  
According to the reports by Amnesty International, 
CEAR and the Red Cross, the centre showed signs of 
significant deterioration and did not guarantee basic 
hygiene conditions. These reports also document 
that the detainees were concentrated in a few rooms, 
in overcrowded conditions and were unable to go 
outside. According to Amnesty International, the 
Nouadhibou centre’s conditions did not seem to 
fulfil the provisions of the Body of Principles for 
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the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment.89 
Deportations at the border. Migrants from third 
countries removed by Spain or arrested in Mauritania 
when they (allegedly) sought to travel towards Spain 
irregularly, were removed to the borders with Mali 
and Senegal. According to a Mauritanian official 
interviewed by Amnesty International, in 2006 
the number was 11,600 and in 2007 it was 7,100. 
Malians and those who had supposedly entered 
Mauritania through Mali were removed to Mali; the 
rest, regardless of their nationality, were removed 
to Senegal. Amnesty International observed that 
migrants were often abandoned close to the border 
with little food and no means of transport.90  For 
those detained who lived and worked in Mauritania 
and who apparently had no intention of emigrating, 
the detention and subsequent removal meant the 
forced abandonment of their lives and the near 
certainty of losing their habitual work and activity.
2.2.4 Effectiveness in reducing 
irregular arrivals
Volume of arrivals
The implementation of a comprehensive strategy to 
detect, intercept and detain irregular migrants on 
their way to Spain across the maritime West African 
route had a seminal effect, reducing the volume 
of arrivals in the Canary Islands. According to the 
official data provided by the Ministry of Interior, in 
2006 more than 30,000 immigrants arrived in the 
archipelago (Figure 1). During the following years 
the number of arrivals in the Canary Islands dropped 
very sharply: 12,478 in 2007, 9,181 in 2008, 2,246 in 
2009, and 196 in 2010. In 2012, the Canary Islands 
accounted for only 5% of all arrivals on the Spanish 
coasts, representing a 99% reduction as compared 
with 2006 (Figure 2).
FIGURE 1.  
Irregular arrivals in the Canary Islands, 1999–15: Total number of interceptions
Source: Ministry of Interior.
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FIGURE 2.  
Distribution of arrivals by maritime migration routes, 1999–2012 (%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
20122011201020092008200720062005200420032002200120001999
West African route West Mediterranean route
Source: Ministry of Interior.
This reduction in arrivals in the Canary Islands 
can be interpreted as the direct result of the 
implementation of a multi-layered strategy to contain 
irregular flows and to improve the effectiveness of 
surveillance procedures through early detection and 
prevention. This strategy included joint surveillance 
and police cooperation. The specific effect of the 
Nouadhibou centre, as an instrument to deport 
migrants in transit through Mauritania on their way 
to the Canary Islands, is difficult to isolate in the 
framework of this comprehensive deterrence policy. 
The detention centre at Nouadhibou was part of the 
implementation of a ‘blocking strategy’ to contain 
irregular flows, affecting mostly migrants in transit.
Composition of flows
According to the data provided by the regional 
government,91  in 2006 over half of all immigrants 
arriving in the Canary Islands were from Senegal 
(53.9%), followed by nationals from Gambia (12%), 
Mali (11.4%) and the Ivory Coast (5.6%) (Table 1). 
Moroccans represented 4.1% of the total.92  Then, in 
2007, the distribution of immigrants by nationality 
changed significantly. The shares of Senegalese and 
Malians dropped to 23.6% and 9.2% respectively, 
while the shares of immigrants from Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea and Guinea-Bissau slightly increased.93 
23
Offshoring asylum and migration in Australia, Spain, Tunisia and the US
This decline in the number of immigrants from 
Senegal and Mali arriving in the Canaries could be a 
combined effect of the expansion of pre-emptive and 
externalisation policies in Senegal and Mauritania, 
on the one hand, and the deterrent effect of an 
increasing number of deported immigrants under 
the readmission agreements, on the other. Between 
2006 and 2007, the number of returnees under 
the readmission agreements increased 35.4%.94  
Unfortunately, there are no official data on the 
annual number of readmissions disaggregated by 
nationality, so the direct effects of these policies on 
the national composition of the flows are unclear. 
TABLE 1.  
Immigrants arriving in the Canaries, distribution by nationality, 2004–07 (%)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Gambia 20.1 26.5 12.1 19.7
Ghana 4.4 4.3 0.6 3.5
Guinea 6.3 4.3 2.4 8.0
Guinea-Bissau 4.3 7.1 3.2 4.9
Ivory Coast 3.7 5.7 5.6 6.2
Mali 34.4 28.0 11.4 9.2
Mauritania 2.3 1.4 0.6 3.6
Morocco 11.0 16.9 4.1 7.6
Senegal 0.3 2.5 53.9 23.6
Others 13.2 3.3 6.1 13.7
Source: Godenau (2014), op. cit.
The case of the Nouadhibou centre
There are no available data about the total number of 
immigrants detained at the Nouadhibou centre and 
deported from Mauritania under the readmission 
agreement with Spain. According to the Red Cross 
report,95  9,733 immigrants received assistance at 
the Nouadhibou centre between 2006 and 2008 
(4,103 in 2006, 3,538 in 2007, and 2,092 in 2008). Red 
Cross interviewed 5,170 of them. All the immigrants 
interviewed were male. In terms of nationalities, 54% 
were from Senegal, 31% from Mali and 5.5% from 
Gambia. Among them, 82% had travelled on boats, 
which shows the significant number of detainees 
who had either been intercepted at sea or deported 
from Spain. The share of those being deported for 
the first time to their countries of origin was 98.8%. 
In terms of the migrants’ future migratory plans, in 
2006 79.1% declared that they had a plan to try again 
to reach Spanish soil, with this percentage dropping 
to 10.84% in 2007 and 0.2% in 2008. This reduction 
may be explained by the practices of deterrence, 
control in transit and deportation – framed in an 
environment of uncertainty and insecurity.
2.2.5 Impact on intra-regional 
mobility
Effects on the maritime migration system in 
Spain
The deployment of this comprehensive and multi-
layered externalisation and surveillance policy 
contained the total numbers of arrivals throughout 
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the last decade. In 2000, when this strategy started 
to be deployed in the Strait of Gibraltar and the 
Alboran Sea, 15,195 immigrants where intercepted 
at the Spanish coast. This number reached a peak of 
39,180 in 2006, with the Canary Islands as the main 
destination point. In 2012, just over 3,800 irregular 
immigrants were intercepted on the Spanish coast, 
less than 10% of the total interceptions in 2006 
(Figure 3).
FIGURE 3. 
Irregular immigrants arriving in Spain, 1999–2012: Total number of interceptions (maritime routes)
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Source: Ministry of Interior.
The geographical sequence of the implementation 
of this strategy had a dynamic effect on the maritime 
route system with changes over the years, including, 
as mentioned previously, a diversion of the flows 
from the Western Mediterranean to the West African 
route (Figure 4).96  The blockage of transit migration 
through Mauritania and Senegal diverted the flows 
from the Atlantic routes to the Saharan routes across 
Mali, Niger, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. 
The Western Mediterranean route is currently the 
main point of entry to Spain, although with smaller 
volumes than observed in the mid-2000s (see Figure 
5). An increase in arrivals via Ceuta and Melilla 
through the land route has also been observed since 
2010 and especially since 2013 (Figure 5).
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FIGURE 4.  
Evolution in the dynamics of the Spanish maritime routes, 1999–2015
Note: No official data have been provided by the Ministry of Interior since September 2016 (the last annual 
number available is for 2015). According to data provided by Frontex, in 2016 10,231 immigrants reached Spain 
through the Western Mediterranean route and 671 through the West African route (see http://frontex.europa.
eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/). The latest data provided by the UNHCR (updated 20 December 
2017) show that the total sea arrivals in Spain in 2017 was 21,258 (see https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/esp).
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FIGURE 5. Evolution in the dynamics of the Spanish land and maritime routes, 2010–15
Source: Ministry of Interior.
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Intra-regional effects: Heading east, 
criminalised in Mauritania and stuck in 
Morocco
The increasing surveillance of the West African and 
Western Mediterranean routes during the 2000s 
may have contributed to diverting the flows to the 
Central Mediterranean route, with Tunisia and 
Libya as main departure countries and Malta and 
Italy as main destination countries. In 2008, almost 
40,000 immigrants were detected on the Central 
Mediterranean route while 15,700 were detected 
on the West African and Western Mediterranean 
routes. Six years later, in 2014, according to the data 
provided by Frontex, 170,000 immigrants were 
detected on the Central Mediterranean corridor and 
8,115 on the Spanish ones.97 
While there might have been other important 
factors at play beyond the changing nature of entries 
from the Western to the Central Mediterranean 
route, the implementation of these policies could 
be expected to have played an important role in 
deviating mobility patterns to alternative routes. The 
Central Mediterranean route became more active in 
2011, during the ‘Arab Spring’, and again after 2013, 
following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and the 
rise of violence in Libya.98 
Spanish migration policies have also had a significant 
impact on Mauritania’s migration management. 
In the 2000s, Mauritania became a notable transit 
country in the Western Mediterranean migration 
system. But before becoming a country of transit 
for migrants, Mauritania had had a long history as a 
destination country.99  As a member of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
nationals from other African countries could move 
there freely. After leaving this organisation in 1999, 
Mauritania signed bilateral agreements with Senegal 
and Mali,100  which again allowed most immigrants 
to move freely to Mauritania. In practice, the state 
did not really control entry and residence. After the 
agreement signed with Spain, however, irregularity 
became central to the Mauritanian migration policy. 
Mauritanian police forces started to patrol not only 
harbours and coastal areas but also the land borders 
with Senegal and Mali and the most important 
towns. As Dünnwald highlights, this external 
interference fuelled “the introduction of controls, 
administrative regulations and criminal offences”, 
with the irregularisation and criminalisation of 
migration as the main consequence.101  Amnesty 
International severely criticised Mauritania for the 
ill-treatment of irregular immigrants and refugees 
and the Mauritanian Association for Human Rights 
(AMDH) warned of an increasingly racist approach to 
immigrants.102 
Since the 2000s, Morocco has been a fundamental 
part of the Spanish – and European – externalisation 
policy as a main transit country. Over the years 
the growing difficulties of reaching Spain (and 
the returns of Sub-Saharan nationals, including 
pushbacks) have increased the volume of transit 
migrants trapped in Morocco. A survey conducted in 
2008 by AMERM (Association Marocaine d’Etudes et 
de Recherche sur les Migrations) estimated that most 
transiting irregular migrants came from Nigeria, 
Mali, Senegal, Congo and the Ivory Coast. Almost 
60% of the interviewees indicated that they did not 
have any income, 18% lived by begging, 12% worked 
occasionally and 8% received some support from 
charity organisations.103 
The average duration of their stay was 2.5 years 
and, in terms of migration intentions, 11% wanted 
to return to their countries of origin, 73% to go to a 
third country and 2% to stay in Morocco, according 
to AMERM (2008).104  This survey also highlighted 
the difficulties of their daily life in Morocco in terms 
of precariousness and discrimination by Moroccan 
society.105  Since 2010, several international reports 
have highlighted the poor living conditions and the 
vulnerability of Sub-Saharan immigrants who are 
unable to move to Europe or return to their countries 
of origin.106 
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This new immigration reality and the aim of 
changing the country’s image regarding the reception 
of irregular immigrants fuelled important changes 
in Moroccan immigration policy, especially with 
regard to transit migration.107  The 2011 Constitution 
introduced provisions regarding non-discrimination 
and the protection of immigrants’ rights, and 
strongly affirmed the central importance of human 
rights. In 2013, the National Council for Human 
Rights (CNDH) published a report demanding the 
elimination of police violence against irregular 
immigrants, the implementation of measures to fight 
discrimination, access to basic services for irregular 
immigrants and a regularisation programme.108  
Despite these new trends, there is still a long way 
ahead to ensure the respect of human rights and 
adequate living conditions of transiting Sub-Saharan 
immigrants living in Morocco.
2.3 TUNISIA109
Key findings and lessons learned
The Tunisian and Libyan revolutions in 2011 led to large flows of persons to Tunisia, 
particularly Libyans and persons fleeing from Libya. These migratory flows in turn led to 
an emergency response from the Tunisian authorities, inter alia with the establishment of 
camps near the Tunisian–Libyan border. Of these camps, in which the IOM and UNHCR 
were involved, the Choucha camp was directly managed by the UNHCR.
Despite Tunisia being a Party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the prohibition of 
extraditing ‘political refugees’ in its Constitution, Tunisia does not have legislation on 
asylum describing specific administrative measures available to asylum seekers.
The UNHCR was responsible for the refugee status determination (RSD) procedures in the 
Choucha camp, as well as resettlement efforts for recognised refugees registered in the 
Choucha camp prior to 1 December 2011. The UNHCR was further responsible for offering 
options for recognised refugees to settle in Tunisia, as well as the repatriation of other 
asylum seekers.
A number of challenges have been identified in respect of the Choucha camp. The UNHCR 
was found to be unable to protect asylum seekers from potential threats or harassment. 
The procedures in the Choucha camp moreover suffered from inappropriate behaviour of 
the camp’s staff, the lack of access to interpreters and irregularities in the management 
of files. Additional violations were found in respect of the lack of a reasoned decision in 
writing for rejected asylum seekers, and the lack of the right to review by an independent 
authority.
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The Choucha camp was characterised by deficiencies in the reception conditions. The lack of 
adequate protection from harsh weather conditions and the inability of the UNHCR and the 
Tunisian army to guarantee the safety of persons in the Choucha camp were noted. Furthermore, 
the division/segmentation of the Choucha camp’s occupants based on nationality and ethnicity 
led to tensions between the different communities within the camps.
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the establishment of the Choucha camp had any 
direct impact on avoiding departures to Europe through irregular channels. Some have argued 
that the presence of the UNHCR attracted asylum seekers to the Choucha camp and Tunisia, 
thereby acting as an incentive for departure and displacement.
The UNHCR has also been involved in efforts to create a legal framework for asylum in Tunisia. 
However, a recognised and effective protected status for asylum seekers and refugees, while 
certainly required and useful, cannot be a substitute for a European asylum policy.
2.3.1 Introduction
It can be considered that the outsourcing of asylum in 
Tunisia began in 2011, after the Tunisian and Libyan 
revolutions, mainly with the setting-up of a UNHCR 
programme to determine refugee status. While in 
the midst of a revolution, the country had to face 
the arrival of thousands from neighbouring Libya. 
Several camps were prepared near the Libyan border 
to house refugees and exiles in border towns such 
as Medenine, Tataouine or Dhehiba. The UNHCR 
assumed direct responsibility for the management 
of the Choucha camp, right at the border. The 
UNHCR considers the operation to be a success, 
providing statistics on resettlements and ‘voluntary 
returns’. However, various international human 
rights organisations have criticised the management 
of the camp, the processing of asylum claims, and, 
paradoxically, the closing down of the camp. These 
difficulties encountered by the UNHCR show the 
pitfalls of outsourcing asylum.
2.3.2 Context
In January 2011, four weeks of mass demonstrations 
and sit-ins around the country led to the departure 
of then President Ben Ali, who had been president 
of the Tunisian Republic since 1987. This revolution 
was considered an example for similar protest 
movements in other countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa region. In Libya, the revolution 
against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi was much 
less peaceful: a civil war unfolded between February 
and October 2011 and led to an international military 
intervention. These events gave rise to important 
changes in migration patterns and in the profiles of 
migrants and refugees in the whole region.
Indeed, migration was not a new experience. 
Undocumented emigration from Tunisia had been a 
long-term phenomenon. Moreover, non-Tunisians, 
mainly from countries to the south, also tried to leave 
Tunisian shores towards Malta or Italy. This was also 
the case in Libya, where many people from other 
African countries went to find work or to try to leave 
for Italy. This had resulted in European countries 
adopting policies that externalised migration control 
before the Tunisian revolution. Since the 1990s, 
European countries have put increasing pressure on 
departure countries, and since the 2000s, the EU has 
joined them in pressuring third countries, classified 
as ‘origin’ or ‘transit’ countries.
One of the main tools of externalisation is the 
negotiation of readmission agreements. The 
purpose of these negotiations of more or less 
formal agreements110  is to ensure the cooperation 
of departure countries in the implementation of 
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deportation from European countries. Another 
related policy has been to enrol these countries 
in North Africa in border control, for example by 
organising common operations with Frontex, or 
by pressuring them to adopt new migration laws, 
criminalising in particular irregular exit from their 
country.111  As a result, the Tunisian legal context 
for migration had already been modified before the 
revolution.
After 2011, with the collapse of the Ben Ali regime 
and the civil war in Libya, thousands of people 
took to the roads or to sea. Tunisia had to deal 
with a very different situation, in the midst of 
important institutional and political changes. After 
the beginning of the conflict in Libya, during a 
six-month period, an estimated 1 million people 
arrived in Tunisia, including 200,000 non-Libyans.112 
The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network 
identified four waves of migrants and exiles:113 
• first, ‘tens of thousands’ of young Tunisians, 
mostly men, leaving for Italy. The temporary 
collapse of the security and coastal surveillance 
systems might have encouraged these departures;
• a second, incoming wave, of approximately 
400,000 refugees and foreign workers from 
Libya;
• third, Libyans, including many families, fleeing 
the conflict and NATO bombings. The Tunisian 
National Institute of Statistics estimated that 
800,000 Libyans entered Tunisia between March 
and October 2011; and
• fourth, people from other African countries who 
were in Libya and who were forced onto boats by 
the Qaddafi regime. Most reached Italy, many also 
lost their lives, and a number of boats reached 
Tunisian shores or were towed to Tunisian ports.
In this context, the UNHCR started its activities in 
the country, as an emergency response to this sudden 
arrival of thousands of people, including many 
asylum seekers, in Tunisia.
2.3.3 An emergency response
As Libyans and others were arriving in great 
numbers in Tunisia after February 2011, camps were 
established in Tunisia, mainly in border towns and 
communities near Libya. The IOM and the UNHCR 
were involved in these efforts. The IOM carried out 
the ‘voluntary repatriation’ of some of the foreigners 
in humanitarian camps. The UNHCR was involved 
in humanitarian support (such as distribution of 
tents and food) and in the organisation of refugee 
status determination (RSD). It also assumed direct 
responsibility for the management of one camp 7 km 
away from the border post of Ras Jedir, the Choucha 
camp, for which it delegated the management and 
provision of services to the Danish Refugee Council.114 
Indeed, although Tunisia had been a Party to the 1951 
Geneva Convention, and the constitution of 1959 
(which was repealed in December 2011) prohibited 
the extradition of ‘political refugees’, no legislation 
on asylum described specific administrative 
measures available to asylum seekers. In 1968, the 
UNHCR signed an agreement with the Tunisian 
government granting it the status of honorary 
representation. Yet, until mid-2011, the UNHCR’s 
presence had been limited to this. A headquarters 
agreement was signed in June 2011. This allowed the 
UNHCR to open offices in the south of the country 
and to start regional missions.115 
In the Tunisian case, the UNHCR’s activities in North 
Africa can be considered an emergency response. 
They are nonetheless part of an increased trend for 
the UNHCR being enrolled in the European policy 
of externalisation not only of border and migration 
control, but also of asylum and asylum processing. 
The EU, for example, largely funded the launch of 
the UNHCR’s activities in Morocco in 2004. The EU 
and European countries have reaffirmed their choice 
to favour the external processing of asylum claims 
and resettlement programmes. European countries 
reinforced border controls in times of crises and war 
in North Africa did not allow many people to claim 
asylum directly in Europe. Since then, part of the 
EU’s effort to externalise asylum has also consisted of 
supporting the UNHCR’s project to help the Tunisian 
government draft specific legislation on asylum.
The activities of the UNHCR in Tunisia are thus 
an interesting case for examining the offshoring 
of asylum, in particular through its activities of 
RSD at the Choucha camp. The camp officially 
opened on 24 February 2011.116  At the height of 
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the conflict in Libya, it received an average of 
18,000 people per day.117  The UNHCR started a 
resettlement programme for people registered before 
1 December 2011 and recognised as refugees. This 
led to a situation in which a variety of people lived in 
the Choucha camp. In January 2013, the Tunis Centre 
for Migration and Asylum (CeTuMa) distinguished 
four different administrative categories of people in 
the Choucha camp:118 
• refugees recognised by the UNHCR but not yet 
resettled. Even for them, in spite of the UNHCR’s 
decision, resettlement was not guaranteed since 
it depended on the decision of potential host 
countries;
• refugees who had obtained the refugee status 
but could not claim resettlement because their 
cases had been registered after the deadline of the 
programme (1 December 2011);
• asylum seekers who had been denied refugee 
status and were not under the responsibility of the 
UNHCR anymore, but who did not have anywhere 
else to go; and
• asylum seekers who arrived after 1 December 2011 
and who were still waiting for a decision on their 
refugee status.
In 2011, the UNHCR examined 4,670 asylum 
claims, of which 3,500 were given refugee status.119  
According to UNHCR reports, in all more than 4,000 
people were granted refugee status. Of these 4,000, 
almost 3,600 persons were accepted for resettlement 
in the framework of the Global Resettlement 
Solidarity Initiative, and between 3,270 and 3,567 
people had already left in 2014 for a host country, 
mostly the US, Norway, Sweden and Germany.120  In 
this process, the IOM helped to coordinate logistical 
aspects for the relocation121  of 3,728 people between 
March 2011 and 2014.122 
Moreover, the IOM organised the ‘voluntary return’ 
of more than 400,000 people in 2011, mostly 
between March and April, in just two months. Large 
shares of these returns were to Egypt (approximately 
86,000 people) and to Bangladesh (approximately 
28,000 people). Many other returns were organised 
to Sudan, Chad or the Philippines,123  where the 
political context is far from safe.
While the impact and results of setting up the 
Choucha camp are difficult to measure, a number 
of problems have been underlined in different 
reports. These problems fall within two categories: 
first, issues in the processing of asylum claims and 
resettlement applications; and second, issues in the 
management of the camp.
2.3.4 Processing of asylum 
seekers and impact on 
refugee rights
A 2014 report124  examined in detail the legal 
deficiencies of the UNHCR’s RSD procedure, with 
special attention to the case of Choucha. It converges 
with other similar assessments125  and concludes 
that the actual procedure is far from the Procedural 
Standards for Refugee Status Determination under 
the UNHCR’s Mandate (RSD Standards) issued 
internally by the UNHCR in 2003 and published in 
September 2005.126 
Conditions of access to the RSD procedure
The UNHCR has the obligation to provide facilities 
where asylum seekers are protected from potential 
threats or harassment (section 2.4 of the RSD 
Standards). Nevertheless, the reporting team found 
that this condition was not ensured, for example 
for Chadian nationals, who complained that the 
presence of Chadian officials in the camp put them at 
risk. This also raised questions about the UNHCR’s 
impartiality.127  Similar cases were raised about the 
access of Nigerian authorities to personal files.128  
Security issues also arose from the proximity of the 
camp to the Libyan border.129 
Another issue was access to the procedure and 
staff behaviour: some testimonies pointed to 
ignored asylum claims and pressures to return. No 
information was available to asylum seekers on the 
complaint procedure, contrary to what section 2.6 of 
the RSD Standards states.130 
The 2014 report also underlines that, contrary to 
provision 2.5.1 of the RSD Standards, the asylum 
seekers’ right to an interpreter at all stages of the 
process was not always respected in Choucha, 
mostly due to a lack of professional interpreters.131  
Moreover, reports also highlight the fact that some 
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interpreters might have been part of tribes or ethnic 
groups that were enemies of those of the asylum 
seekers.132 
Finally, in spite of provision 2.2 of the RSD Standards, 
which states that each camp should establish detailed 
procedures for the management of files, irregularities 
were reported in the handling of documents by the 
UNHCR at the Choucha camp. This led for example 
to the loss of passports by the UNHCR.133  Other 
irregularities were reported, such as errors in the 
transcription of names or inconsistencies in the 
designation of citizenship from one part of the file to 
the next.134 
Fairness and impartiality in RSD
In spite of the unclear status of the ICCPR in 
international law, the UNHCR has instructed its 
employees to respect the spirit of this covenant. 
Article 14 stipulates that all people should be 
considered equal before courts, which should be 
competent, independent and impartial.135  However, 
RSD Standards are sometimes in breach of this right 
to a fair trial and due process. More specifically, this 
concerns the information given to rejected asylum 
seekers and the process of appeal.136 
This overview shows the difficulty of ensuring 
the respect of due process for refugee status 
determination in an emergency context in a camp 
with limited means.
2.3.5 Management of the camp
The difficult conditions of life in the Choucha 
camp have been underlined in several reports and 
press articles. Choucha is located in the desert, 
and residents were exposed to very wide variations 
in temperatures and frequent sandstorms. Mostly 
living in tents, they were not adequately protected 
from these harsh conditions.137  Hygiene was also an 
issue, as there were at first only “two sanitation blocs 
for 10,000 persons, no showers and only a very few 
water points”.138  Overpopulation quickly led to fears 
of epidemics.139 
In coordination with the Tunisian Health Ministry, 
EU representatives, the World Health Organization, 
Unicef, as well as nongovernmental organisations, 
efforts were directed towards hygiene. Latrines 
and points of access to water were built. Waste 
management services were organised with the 
collaboration of the neighbouring town Ben 
Guerdane.140  Other health actions concentrated on 
mental health and maternal/perinatal care.141  Within 
the UNHCR, the general assessment of the camp in 
2012–13 was that the facilities exceeded the expected 
standards and were much better than in other 
camps.142 
At the same time, the safety of residents was difficult 
to maintain. The distance from the Libyan border 
did not guarantee an escape from the conflict 
there. Moreover, although safety was in principle 
ensured by the Tunisian army, the scarcity of 
different resources and of services led to tensions 
inside the camp, mostly between different refugee 
communities, and between residents of the camp and 
the inhabitants of the nearby town, Ben Guerdane.
Within the camp, the UNHCR divided lodgings and 
areas on the basis of nationality and ethnicity. The 
segregation of people upon arrival was based on 
their identification papers or on self-declaration, 
though subject to verification by the UNHCR. The 
UNHCR’s explanation for this organisation was that 
it was more favourable to a peaceful functioning of 
the camp on a daily basis. Others have underlined 
that this segregation of populations also made it 
easier to locate and control people.143  Even so, this 
organisation actually seemed to heighten tensions, 
especially as treatment by the UNHCR seemed to 
depend on these categorisations; the separation of 
Oromos from other Ethiopians and of Darfuris from 
other Sudanese144  was also tied to a quasi-automatic 
access to refugee status for these populations 
(considered to be persecuted minorities in their 
countries of origin), but not for others.145 
A few months before the camp was closed down, 
these distinctions became essential: rejected asylum 
seekers were pushed to leave, and provision of food 
and services was restricted to recognised refugees. 
The UNHCR tried to reorganise the camp based 
on administrative status, progressively shutting off 
services like water provision from some sectors and 
restricting them to two of the initial five sectors.146  
Thus, rather than pacifying the camp, categorisation 
only seemed to heighten tensions and may have 
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played a role in the participation of residents in riots 
in 2011.147 
Tensions also emerged between the local population 
and residents in the camp. This was probably 
related in large part to the unstable and complicated 
situation of Tunisia at the time, and to the scarcity 
of some goods. The camp was targeted by arson 
twice, in May 2011 and March 2012. Following the 
2011 arson, riots erupted and involved the local 
population, the population of the camp, and the 
authorities; the camp faced attacks, including 
destruction of its church.148  Overall, it thus seemed 
very difficult for the UNHCR and the Tunisian army 
to ensure the safety of residents at the camp.
2.3.6 Failed closure of the camp 
and continued issues with 
asylum seekers in Tunisia 
and beyond
The Choucha camp was officially closed on 30 June 
2013. After most inhabitants had been resettled 
or encouraged to leave, water and electricity were 
shut down, toilets and showers were destroyed.149  
According to the UNHCR and Tunisian officials, 
the Choucha camp did “not exist anymore”.150  
Still, different reports by journalists and by 
nongovernmental organisations claim that some 
people remained: at first, around 700 people stayed 
behind;151  150 people by August 2014;152  and 60 
by the end of 2016, with some leaving for different 
places in Tunisia or elsewhere.153 
Since their organisation did not have jurisdiction 
over the camp anymore, UNHCR officials denied 
any responsibility for the people who stayed 
behind, claiming they were rejected asylum 
seekers. However, others found that while rejected 
asylum seekers were there, a number of people 
with a recognised status as refugees were also 
present. Rejected asylum seekers demanded a 
reappraisal of their situation. Refugees demanded 
resettlement, given the absence of a specific Tunisian 
residence or work permit for them. Although the 
Tunisian government announced that those who 
remained could get residency permits, they never 
received them because they did not meet the legal 
requirements. In addition, some ‘new residents’ were 
coming and going from the camp.154 
The ‘people of Choucha’, although limited in 
numbers, organised and gained public attention, 
mostly through a blog, Voice of Choucha, and 
sit-ins in front of official buildings such as the EU 
delegation’s building in Tunis.155  These actions had 
started even before the camp was closed down, for 
example in 2013, when refugees protested against 
the UNHCR’s plan for local integration.156  Several 
articles in international newspapers concentrated 
on their claims: “UNHCR finish your job”, “I 
want resettlement”.157  In June 2017, Tunisian 
authorities forcibly evacuated the camp and 30 to 
40 people were relocated in Tunisia. Human rights 
organisations denounced the non-compliance of the 
Tunisian government and the UNHCR with refugee 
law and human rights.158 
This attracted attention to the absence of asylum 
law in Tunisia. Some of the activities of the UNHCR 
in Tunisia have been directed at improving the 
situation of refugees in the country. For example, 
in 2016 it established an agreement with the 
Tunisian Post Office to provide cash assistance 
to ‘vulnerable refugees’, a mechanism that could 
be expanded to up to 100,000 people if needed. 
With the Arab Institute for Human Rights, they 
have also supported the preparation of a code of 
conduct for reporting on refugee and asylum issues 
(with the Union of Tunisian Journalists), and also 
advocated the adoption of a national law on asylum. 
In 2017, it worked on supporting the setting-up of 
a comprehensive national protection system.159  It 
was announced in February 2017 that the Tunisian 
government was indeed working on the preparation 
of such a law.160 
Yet, the situation of Tunisia is politically unstable 
and the economy is not thriving (unemployment 
was 15.6% in 2016). Migrants can find it difficult to 
establish themselves in Tunisian cities. A recognised 
and effective protected status for asylum seekers and 
refugees, while certainly required and useful, cannot 
be a substitute for a European asylum policy.
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2.4 THE UNITED STATES 161
Key findings and lessons learned
The adoption by the US of the standards set forth by the 1951 Refugee Convention has led 
to two channels for refugee processing: an overseas refugee processing and resettlement 
programme and an asylum procedure for those who reached the US by their own means. 
Typically, the US President sets a worldwide annual quota for the number of refugees who 
will be resettled in the US. There is no quota on the number who receive asylum each year.
Many individuals who could not reach an overseas refugee processing centre attempted to 
travel to the US to apply for asylum. Starting in the 1980s the US Coast Guard established 
interdiction programmes to prevent asylum seekers from reaching US shores. This led to 
the US Supreme Court ruling in Sale v Haitian Centers Council that the international and 
domestic non-refoulement obligations apply only to actions taken on US territory, and not 
to actions in international waters.
The maritime interdiction programme and subsequent developments led to two additional 
types of extraterritorial asylum processing: i) cursory screenings on-board US maritime 
vessels immediately following interdictions at sea; and ii) in-country asylum processing 
centres in Haiti, Cuba and Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras). 
These small extraterritorial refugee processing programmes allowed individuals fleeing 
persecution to apply for protection without having left their homeland and were coupled 
with resettlement within the US.
The on-board screenings of potential refugees interdicted at sea have been criticised for 
multiple deficiencies from a human rights perspective, including the lack of procedural 
fairness (owing to inter alia the extremely taxing conditions in which the screening process 
takes place, the lack of legal assistance, lack of an impartial decision-maker and lack of 
possibilities to review negative decisions). These inadequate screening procedures result 
in the potential refoulement of international protection seekers, as well as subjecting them 
to the risk of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.
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The in-country asylum processing in Haiti, Cuba and Central America has been 
substantially better than the shipboard screening and the truncated tent camp 
proceedings in terms of the physical settings for interview, the amount of time devoted 
to interviews, the availability of interpreters or bilingual decision-makers, and the 
automatic review of negative decisions (under the Central American Minors (CAM) refugee 
programme), but significant human rights concerns still remain. For example, processing 
asylum applicants in their country of origin subjects them to the fear of persecution and 
violence. Furthermore, none of the extraterritorial processing centres provide for channels 
of judicial review.
There is insufficient evidence to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of US 
extraterritorial asylum policies on the migratory flows from Haiti, Cuba and Central 
America. With regard to Haitian asylum seekers, the maritime interdiction appears to have 
prevented many individuals from reaching the US and to have rejected the protection 
claims of an implausibly large number of individuals. The small in-country refugee 
processing programme closed after several years, while interdictions at sea have continued 
for more than three decades.
With regard to Cuban asylum seekers, the results of the maritime interdiction that started 
in the mid-1990s appear more equivocal. Simultaneously, the US launched both a large 
traditional migrant processing programme and a small in-country asylum processing office 
in Cuba. Although dwarfed by the 20,000 immigrant visas provided per year, an average 
of 3,300 Cuban refugees have been processed in Cuba and resettled in the US every 
year since 1995. Further analysis is needed to establish whether there is an independent 
correlation between the offshore asylum processing in Cuba and the reduction in number 
of maritime interdictions at sea of Cuban nationals.
With regard to Central American asylum seekers, the CAM in-country processing 
programme limited eligibility to a small segment of the population and lasted for only three 
years. Just as the programme developed expertise and established a record of resettlement 
in the US, the Trump Administration terminated it. During its brief existence, the CAM 
programme did not appear to reduce migration from Central America to the US.
35
Offshoring asylum and migration in Australia, Spain, Tunisia and the US
2.4.1 Introduction
The US has a long history of offshoring asylum 
processing. In the 1940s in the aftermath of World 
War II, the US accepted refugees and displaced 
persons who had been vetted in camps in Europe.162  
In the 1950s, after the failed Hungarian revolt against 
the Soviet Union, the US resettled Hungarians who 
had been processed as refugees in Austria.163  In 
the 1970s, in the wake of the Vietnam War, the US 
began a decades-long Orderly Departure Program 
that processed applicants in Ho Chi Minh City and in 
Bangkok for resettlement as refugees in the US.164  All 
of these programmes originated in the pre-modern 
era of refugee law, an era marked by vast discretion 
wielded by sovereign states.
The modern era, launched by the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its prohibition 
against non-refoulement, 165  led the US to enact 
the Refugee Act of 1980, which establishes two 
avenues for protecting refugees: an overseas refugee 
processing and resettlement programme and an 
asylum procedure for those who reached the US by 
their own means.166  More than 3 million refugees 
have arrived in the US via the overseas processing.167  
They underwent elaborate offshore screening in 
multiple sites outside the US, including assessment 
by the UNHCR and refugee nongovernmental 
organisations, individual interviews by US officials, 
security screening, medical examinations, cultural 
orientation and travel arrangements.168 
Refugees and asylum seekers fleeing persecution 
in the Americas have generally sought protection in 
the US via the asylum process, not via the overseas 
refugee programme. The asylum process allows 
individuals at the border or within the US to apply 
for asylum, which involves interviews with asylum 
officers, hearings in Immigration Court and appeals 
to administrative and judicial tribunals. In contrast to 
the overseas refugee resettlement process, which has 
a yearly quota, there are no numerical limitations on 
those granted asylum.
When political instability in the Caribbean led large 
numbers of asylum seekers to board small boats and 
set sail for the US in 1980, the US did not treat them 
as refugees or channel them into the overseas refugee 
programme.169  Instead, alarmed by the potential 
for large migration surges from Caribbean islands, 
the US established maritime interception strategies 
that included a variety of ad hoc offshore refugee 
screening processes.
This case study examines the three major 
offshore programmes in the Americas: the Haitian 
interdiction strategy in the 1980s, the Cuban offshore 
refugee programme in the 1990s and the 2014 CAM 
offshore refugee programme.
2.4.2 Practices in response to 
regional migration surges
Haiti
The largest and most intense US efforts to interdict 
asylum seekers in the Caribbean and to process their 
claims outside US territory have targeted Haitian 
nationals. When the Refugee Act of 1980 came into 
effect, Haitians who landed in the US could rely on 
the statutory right to seek asylum. Shortly thereafter, 
in 1981, US President Reagan proclaimed that “illegal 
migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented 
aliens … [has] threatened the welfare and safety 
of … [the US].”170  He directed the US Coast 
Guard to interdict vessels suspected of carrying 
undocumented migrants and to return them to their 
homeland, with the proviso that “no person who is a 
refugee will be returned without his consent.”171 
As a consequence, US officials conducted shipboard 
interrogations, or screening interviews, to determine 
which passengers had a credible fear of persecution. 
Those who did not were returned to Haiti; the 
others were sent to the US for full asylum hearings. 
During the first decade of maritime interdiction, US 
Coast Guard ships intercepted 364 ships in the strait 
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between Haiti and Cuba.172  Only 28 of the Haitian 
passengers were transferred to the US for full asylum 
hearings;173  more than 23,000 were sent back to 
Haiti.174  In light of multiple reports that the Duvalier 
government in Haiti committed widespread human 
rights abuses,175  the minuscule number of Haitians 
acknowledged to have asylum claims is not plausible. 
In 1990, democratic elections bought Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide to the Haitian presidency, and the number 
of boats leaving Haiti plummeted.176  The correlation 
between democratic rule and the steep decline in 
departures is strong evidence that the prior exodus 
was not primarily due to poor economic conditions.
After a military coup deposed President Aristide 
in September 1991, US Coast Guard interdictions 
skyrocketed: from 2,000 in 1991 to 40,000 in 
1992, 5,000 in 1993, and 25,000 in 1994.177  The US 
temporarily suspended all returns to Haiti in early 
1992 as reports circulated of widespread extrajudicial 
killings.178  This led to severe overcrowding on US 
vessels, and the US attempted to establish offshore 
asylum processing in Central America and the 
Caribbean.179  Ultimately, the US brought interdicted 
individuals to the US Naval Base in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba,180  an area of Cuban sovereignty, but 
under total US control.181  US officials carried 
out streamlined asylum screenings; despite the 
harsh conditions and lack of attorneys and courts, 
the officials concluded that more than 10,000 
individuals had a credible fear of persecution that 
qualified them for full asylum hearings in the US.182  
When the asylum screening facilities at the US 
Guantánamo navy base filled to capacity, President 
George H.W. Bush directed the US Coast Guard 
to return all Haitian boats to Haiti.183  All asylum 
screening – on shipboard, at Guantánamo, and in 
other countries – ended.
At this point, the US established small refugee 
processing centres in Haiti itself.184  These centres, in 
Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and Cap Haitien, received 
applications on behalf of 106,000 individuals 
between 1992 and 1995.185  Many satisfied the 
refugee definition, but only the prominent – political 
prisoners, former government officials, targeted 
dissidents, well-known religious leaders and human 
rights activists – were resettled in the US.186 
In May 1994, the US halted blanket repatriations 
to Haiti and resumed shipboard screening.187  
Large numbers of Haitians intercepted at sea soon 
overwhelmed these new locations,188  and the US 
again delivered interdicted Haitians to the US Naval 
Base at Guantánamo Bay.189  Starting in July 1994, the 
US arranged that full refugee determination hearings 
would take place in Guantánamo, but that no Haitian 
refugees would be resettled in the US. Those deemed 
refugees would be offered refuge in UNHCR-run 
camps in other countries in the region.190  Several 
months later, President Aristide returned to Haiti,191  
and the majority of Haitians housed at Guantánamo 
Bay or at other “safe havens” in the region returned 
to Haiti voluntarily.192 
When political violence erupted in Haiti again in 
2004, more Haitians set sail for the US. The US Coast 
Guard intercepted the small boats, held shipboard 
interviews and returned all the passengers to Haiti.193  
Human rights advocates derided the screenings as 
the ‘shout’ test, alleging that only Haitian passengers 
who shout that they fear persecution received even 
a cursory interview.194  Over two decades later, the 
maritime interdiction policy remains in place, and US 
Coast Guard vessels routinely intercept small Haitian 
boats. Table 2 shows the significant variations over 
the years in US interception of Haitians at sea.
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TABLE 2.  
US Coast Guard interceptions of Haitians at sea
YEAR INTERCEPTIONS YEAR INTERCEPTIONS YEAR INTERCEPTIONS
1982 171 1992 37,618 2002 1,486
1983 511 1993 4,270 2003 2,013
1984 1,581 1994 25,302 2004 3,229
1985 3,721 1995 909 2005 1,850
1986 3,422 1996 2,295 2006 1,198
1987 2,866 1997 288 2007 1,610
1988 4,262 1998 1,369 2008 1,582
1989 4,902 1999 1,039 2009 1,782
1990 871 2000 1,113 2010 1,000*
1991 2,065 2001 1,391 2011 1,000*
Note: The Coast Guard reports statistics by fiscal year, which begins on October 1. For example, the 2009 fiscal year 
began on 1 October 2008 and ended on 30 September 2009. Table 532 reports data through 2009; the complete table 
is reproduced in Appendix I, Table AI.1. The 2010 and 2011 entries (marked with asterisks) are estimates based on 
Coast Guard reports of the total number of interdictions, from 1982 to 1 February 2017, produced in response to a May 
2017 Freedom of Information Act Request and posted at Migrants at Sea.org (https://migrantsatsea.files.wordpress.
com/2017/06/2017-06-15_uscg-foia-rspns_amio-data-fy-1982_2017-02-01_2017-cgfo-02153.pdf).
Source: US Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions by Nationality of Aliens, Table 532, available at the US 
Census Bureau website (http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2010/compendia/statab/130ed/tables/11s0532.xls).
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Cuba
From 1959 through 1973, more than 450,000 Cubans 
entered the US,195  and were quickly afforded lawful 
permanent resident status.196  In 1965 and again in 
1980, Cuban authorities allowed mass departures 
from Cuba via small boats, which were welcomed 
by the US.197  Things were different in 1994, after 
a decade of US Coast Guard interdiction in the 
Caribbean Sea. When anti-government protesters 
and thousands of Cubans embarked in small boats,198  
US Coast Guard cutters stopped the boats and 
delivered 32,000 Cubans to the US Naval Station 
at Guantánamo Bay,199  where they joined 15,000 
Haitians.200  The US convinced the Panama Canal 
Zone to house approximately 8,000 Cubans,201  but 
no offshore processing took place.202  US authorities 
negotiated new migration policies with the Cuban 
government in 1994 and 1995.203  Cuba agreed to 
curb unsafe and disorderly departures by sea,204  
while the US agreed to establish a programme in 
Havana to process visas for the admission of 20,000 
Cuban immigrants per year.205  As Table 3 shows, the 
interdictions of Cubans declined dramatically after 
the new migration measures took effect in 1995.
TABLE 3.  
US Coast Guard interdictions of Cuban nationals at sea
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
2,882 38,560 525 411 421 903 1,619 1,000 777
Source: US Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions by Nationality of Aliens, Table 532, available at the US 
Census Bureau website (http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2010/compendia/statab/130ed/tables/11s0532.xls).
The new migration policies had two offshore 
processing components. Cubans intercepted at sea 
would be entitled to an asylum interview, and those 
deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution 
would not be sent back to Cuba. They would not be 
transferred to the US, but, like the Haitians, would be 
eligible for resettlement in other countries.206 
In addition, the US opened a refugee processing and 
resettlement programme in Cuba itself.207  Applicants 
completed a questionnaire and submitted it to the 
US Interests Section in Havana. US refugee officers 
screened the applications and scheduled interviews 
in Havana to determine refugee status.208  In 1995, 
the first year of refugee processing in Cuba, 6,000 
Cubans came to the US as refugees.209  As Figure 6 
shows, refugee processing in Havana has continued; 
an average of 3,300 Cuban refugees have successfully 
completed offshore refugee processing each year 
since 1995.210  Refugee processing still takes place 
in Havana,211  as does the processing of 20,000 
immigrant visas per year, and few Cubans attempt to 
reach the US by boat.212 
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FIGURE 6.  
Estimated arrivals from offshore refugee processing in Cuba
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Sources: R.E. Wasem, “Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends”, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, Washington, DC (2009) (www.fas.org/sgp/crs/rowR40566.pdf); MPI analysis of US Department of State, WRAPS, “Arrival 
by Processing County and Nationality” (www.wrapsnet.org/Portals/1/Arrivals/Arrivals%20FY202014/Arrivals%20Proccessing%20
Country%20and%20Nationality%20-%20Map(10.6.2014).pdf); Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
2011” and “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2013”, Washington, DC (2012 and 2014) (www//dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics).
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Central American minors
Turning from the sea lanes to the land borders, the 
first decade of the 21st century saw dramatic declines 
in the overall numbers of undocumented individuals 
arriving at the southern border of the US.213  
Around 2010, the numbers of children arriving at 
the border began to grow in startling dimensions. 
From 16,000 in 2011 and 24,000 in 2012,214  the 
numbers of unaccompanied youth increased to 
39,000 in 2013 and 68,000 in 2014.215  After 40,000 
unaccompanied children were apprehended in 2015, 
the number increased to 60,000 in 2016.216 
In addition to the sizeable increases in vulnerable 
asylum seekers, there were significant demographic 
changes. As shown in Figure 7, Mexican nationals 
comprised 80% of the unaccompanied youth at the 
US–Mexico border in 2008. A decade later, only 
20% came from Mexico, while the remaining 80% 
were from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, 
three countries experiencing unusually high rates of 
violence.217  
 
FIGURE 7.  
Unaccompanied children apprehended at the southwestern US border, 2008–17
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Source: Hipsman and Meissner (2015), op. cit., p. 3, Figure 1.
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Driven in part by public outcry at the sudden rise 
in the flow of migrants reaching US borders, US 
authorities detained many of the undocumented 
minors in deplorable conditions, subjected them to 
accelerated processing known as expedited removal, 
and provided hearings to determine if they had a 
credible fear of persecution.218 
Hoping to deter minors from travelling to the US, 
the US government established offshore asylum 
processing in Central America. Children from 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras could be 
evaluated in their home country for refugee status 
that would allow them to resettle in the US if they 
had a parent lawfully residing in the US.219  Those 
rejected as refugees because they could not show 
a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a social group could seek protection 
on humanitarian grounds. If successful, they would 
be paroled into the US with a two-year renewable 
residence permit.220 
The CAM refugee programme began in December 
2014, as the US partnered with the IOM, which 
manages Resettlement Support Centres in Latin 
America. After US resident parents filed applications 
on behalf of their children, the IOM contacted 
the children in their homelands and conducted 
pre-screening examination of the cases. US 
immigration officials then conducted in-depth 
interviews, which were followed by security checks 
and medical exams.221 
The programme started slowly. After 18 months, 
9,500 Central American children had applied and 
almost 3,000 had been granted protected status, 
but only 267 had entered the US.222  Improvements 
to the process gradually made a difference. In the 
summer of 2016, Costa Rica consented to shelter 
vulnerable Central American minors as they 
underwent refugee screening and processing.223  The 
Obama Administration expanded the scope of the 
programme to include young people over the age 
of 21, siblings of refugee children, and parents and 
caretakers of children at risk of persecution.224  Two 
and a half years after the CAM programme began, 
2,200 Central American children had been resettled 
in the US as refugees.225  Another 1,500 had received 
two-year residence permits on humanitarian 
grounds.226 
By mid-2017, more than 13,000 had applied,227  
and there were thousands of pending applications 
in a process that generally took 12 to 13 months. 
Applications rejected for refugee status, often 
due to the lack of sufficient documentation, 
were automatically screened for humanitarian 
consideration, and individuals had the right to 
request a review of the denial of their refugee 
application.228  The results, though slow, were 
overwhelmingly positive. One refugee resettlement 
expert estimated that 30% received refugee status, 
while 68% received humanitarian parole.229  She 
predicted the refugee approval rates would have 
been much higher if the applicants had been assisted 
by lawyers and had better access to obtaining 
supporting evidence.230 
When the Trump Administration came to power in 
January 2017, US officials ended the programme. 
Those already approved but not yet in the US 
received notice that their resettlement in the US had 
been cancelled. Those already in the US were warned 
that they could not count on renewal when their 
two-year residence permits expire.231 
2.4.3 Human rights implications
Sale v Haitian Centers Council
The US interdiction, offshore processing, and 
repatriation strategy in the Caribbean in the 1980s 
and 1990s drew strenuous protest, but human 
rights challenges had a mixed record in the US 
courts. When the dispute ultimately reached the 
US Supreme Court in 1993 in Sale v Haitian Centers 
Council,232  the Court advanced a constricted view 
of international refugee law. Acknowledging that it 
was uncontested that “hundreds of Haitians [had] 
been killed, tortured, detained without warrant, 
or subjected to violence and the destruction of 
their property because of their political beliefs,”233  
the Court nonetheless upheld the US decision to 
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interdict and forcibly repatriate Haitians without 
first determining whether they qualify as refugees. 
The Court concluded that both the international and 
US statutory prohibition against refoulement applied 
only with regard to actions taken on its territory. 
Accordingly, it ruled that the US policy to interdict 
refugees on the high seas and return them to Haiti 
without any screening or other processing did not 
violate international law. 234 
International bodies,235  refugee scholars236  and 
jurists237  around the world criticised the Sale 
decision, as did numerous US scholars and 
advocates. The UNHCR decried the Sale reasoning 
as a “setback to modern international refugee 
law”.238  The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights ruled that US interdiction and repatriation of 
Haitians violated the rights to life, liberty, security 
of the person, the right to resort to the courts, and 
the right to seek and receive asylum secured by the 
American Declaration of Human Rights.239 
Human rights at stake
Notwithstanding the US Supreme Court’s disavowal 
of US obligations under international law, the US 
Coast Guard’s interdiction and offshore processing 
programme has raised profound human rights 
concerns. Cursory interviews of human beings 
fleeing persecution, torture, extrajudicial killing and 
other violence, followed by forcible repatriation, may 
deliver individuals into the hands of their oppressors. 
Human rights law exists to prevent this type of harm. 
US maritime interdiction runs afoul of the protection 
against non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol,240  the non-refoulement obligation 
contained in the Convention against Torture, the 
guarantees set forth in the ICCPR against arbitrary 
detention, discriminatory treatment, and inhuman 
and degrading treatment,241  and the right to seek 
asylum recognised by the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man,242  as well as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.243  In 
evaluating the human rights implications of the 
offshore processing strategies employed by the US in 
the Americas, it is useful to distinguish between i) the 
screening systems carried out on shipboard and at 
the US Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay and ii) the 
in-country refugee processing carried out in Haiti, 
Cuba and Central America.
Asylum screening
The inadequacy of the screening interviews has been 
well documented. The maritime interception of 
migrants en route to the US has involved thousands 
of shipboard interrogations and streamlined 
offshore asylum procedures. Though these settings 
varied in detail, they all have taken place in highly 
pressured situations, under extremely taxing physical 
conditions, in the absence of legal advice, without 
an impartial decision-maker and without access 
to review of negative decisions. Sometimes the 
screening of Haitian asylum seekers took place in the 
presence of Haitian officials; frequently it took place 
without adequate interpreters. The circumstances 
varied from outrageous (the ‘shout’ test aboard ship) 
to deplorable to merely dreadful, but they all lack 
basic elements of procedural fairness. It is impossible 
to conclude that they have led to accurate and reliable 
results. Consequently, the possibility – indeed, 
likelihood – is great that refugees have been returned 
to lands where their lives or freedom have been 
threatened, in violation of the basic non-refoulement 
prohibition of international refugee law.
In addition to returning many Haitians to the 
hands of their persecutors, the inadequate 
screening process likely returned them and others 
to the likelihood of torture. This contravenes the 
obligations the US assumed as a State Party to the 
Convention against Torture.244  In recent decades 
reports of conditions in Haiti and in Honduras, El 
Salvador and Guatemala have featured widespread 
extrajudicial killing, bodily assault and other 
infliction of severe physical or mental pain.245  
Although US jurisprudence does not recognise the 
extraterritorial effect of human rights treaties, it 
does recognise that torture can take many forms. 
Turning back migrants to these countries in the 
absence of adequate screening procedures violates 
the international law concerning torture.
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In addition to the threats to non-refoulement, the 
interdiction and offshore processing efforts have 
contravened other human rights protections. There 
were many arbitrary ad hoc detentions in deplorable 
conditions. Migrants did not have notice about their 
legal rights nor the resources to make their plight 
understandable. In many instances US officials 
treated migrants differently based on their race 
and their national origin. In these and many other 
respects basic ICCPR guarantees were flouted, and 
the right to seek asylum, enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and in the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, was 
impeded.
The onshore imprisonment of thousands of 
unaccompanied children at the southern border of 
the US also produced many instances of arbitrary 
detention, with children held overnight in hieleras, 
extremely cold holding cells with inadequate food, 
water and medical care. Others were inappropriately 
housed in prison-like detention centres with adults. 
In May 2018, US officials announced they would 
separate young children and parents who had arrived 
at the southern border together in order to deter 
asylum seekers.246  These situations present clear 
violations of international human rights norms.
In-country processing
The offshore processing the US established in 
more permanent settings in the countries from 
which people were trying to flee raise different 
concerns. These programmes generally avoided 
cursory screenings, detention and inexperienced 
and ill-equipped interviewers. The physical 
settings compared are immeasurably superior to 
those on shipboard or in tent camps, and the time 
constraints inherent in shipboard processing do not 
play a major role in in-country processing. Asylum 
seekers know in advance where and when they must 
file applications, allowing them to prepare their 
explanations and gather supporting evidence.247  
Further, the availability of interpreters or bilingual 
decision-makers in stationary facilities enhances 
the asylum seekers’ ability to communicate their 
claims. Moreover, it is easier to deploy trained 
asylum officers to in-country processing offices, 
and to enhance the effectiveness of the interview 
itself. For example, both the CAM refugee process 
and the Cuba refugee programme employ bilingual, 
experienced US asylum officers to conduct in-depth 
interviews with the applicants.248  Additionally, the 
CAM refugee programme contained a provision 
allowing all those denied refugee status to file a 
request for review within 90 days of the negative 
decision.249 
Clearly, in-country refugee processing is less 
desirable than the asylum process that takes place 
in the US, where asylum seekers typically have less 
fear that government officials, their neighbours or 
other non-state actors will persecute or otherwise 
harm them. There is also greater access to legal 
advice in the US, as well as multiple levels of appeals, 
culminating in review by life-tenured federal judges. 
Nonetheless, if in-country refugee programmes can 
assure adequate access by individuals in need of 
protection, sufficient preparation time, experienced 
asylum interviewers and opportunities for review 
of negative decisions, they are more likely to be 
congruent with international human rights.
2.4.4 Consequences
On migration to the US
Clearly, the floating ‘Berlin Wall’ deployed off the 
northern coast of Haiti and in the Straits of Florida 
north of Cuba has stopped many boats from reaching 
US waters. As Table 4 shows, the past quarter 
century of maritime interdiction has most frequently 
intercepted migrants from two islands: Cuba and 
Hispaniola, which Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
share. The major effects were to reduce the number 
of Haitians seeking refuge in the US in the 1980s 
and 1990s and the number of Cubans attempting 
to reach the US in the early 1990s. The data do not 
reveal what happened to the seaborne migrants after 
the Coast Guard deposited them back in Haiti and 
Cuba, nor indicate how many migrants decided not 
to attempt to reach the US. Unmistakably, the US 
goal was to deter seaborne migration, and there is no 
reason to think that deterrence failed.
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TABLE 4.  
US Coast Guard migrant interdictions by nationality of alien
YEARS HAITI CUBA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
1982 171 0 0
1983 511 44 6
1984 1,581 7 181
1985 3,721 51 113
1986 3,422 28 189
1987 2,866 46 40
1988 4,262 60 254
1989 4,902 257 664
1990 871 443 1,426
1991 2,065 1,722 1,007
1992 37,618 2,066 588
1993 4,27 2,882 873
1994 25,302 38,56 232
1995 909 525 3,388
1996 2,295 411 6,273
1997 288 421 1,2
1998 1,369 903 1,097
1999 1,039 1,619 583
2000 1,113 1 499
2001 1,391 777 659
2002 1,486 666 177
2003 2,013 1,555 1,748
2004 3,229 1,225 5,014
2005 1,85 2,712 3,612
2006 1,198 2,81 3,011
2007 1,61 2,868 1,469
2008 1,582 2,99 688
2009 1,782 799 727
Source: US Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions by Nationality of Aliens, Table 532, available at the US 
Census Bureau website (http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2010/compendia/statab/130ed/tables/11s0532.xls). See Table AI.2 
in the Appendix for the complete interdiction data provided by the US Coast Guard.
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Assessing the impact of the offshore refugee 
processing programmes in Haiti, Cuba and Central 
America on migration flows is more challenging. 
Refugee processing in Haiti lasted for only three 
years, and resettlement opportunities in the US 
were limited. The Central American in-country 
processing, also limited to three years, can more 
accurately be viewed as a family reunification effort 
rather than an offshore asylum programme. Its reach 
did not address the sizeable need for protection that 
exists in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
In contrast, offshore refugee processing in Cuba has 
been steady and ongoing. It is impossible to assess its 
impact, though, because from the beginning it was 
coupled with a much larger traditional immigrant 
processing programme. Making available 20,000 
immigrant visas per year likely had a negative impact 
on launching small boats to make risky clandestine 
journeys. Further, the US decision to refuse to 
admit Cubans intercepted at sea in the US also 
likely deterred sea voyages. The conjunction of the 
offshore refugee processing in Havana, the sizeable 
offshore immigrant processing programme, and the 
prohibitions on resettlement in the US of intercepted 
migrants, appear to have made a great difference. 
Some pressing refugee needs have been addressed 
while significant humanitarian avenues to safety 
have been provided.
On migration within the region
Data on migration of Haitians and Cubans within the 
region is difficult to obtain. The waters surrounding 
Haiti and Cuba present substantial natural barriers 
to migration. The risks to life are considerable 
and the distances are significant. A voyage from 
Haiti to Mexico, the nearest mainland country, is 
approximately 1,500 km. There are no reports of 
a sizeable post-interdiction migration from Haiti 
to Mexico or Central America. On the island of 
Hispaniola, however, hundreds of thousands of 
Haitians have moved to the Dominican Republic to 
seek work over the past century, movement likely 
encouraged by the US maritime interdiction strategy.
The distance from Cuba to Mexico by sea is smaller, 
approximately 500 km, and recent years have seen 
an increase in the number of Cuban migrants in 
Latin America. Roughly 24,000 Cubans travelled by 
air to Ecuador or other countries and then travelled 
overland to the US in 2016; more than 78,000 arrived 
in the US in 2015.250  This regional migration appears 
to be correlated more with the political changes in 
the relations between Cuba and the US than with 
maritime interdiction, however. As relations between 
the US and Cuba have warmed during recent years, 
many Cubans have feared that US visa requirements 
would be applied to Cubans, thus ending their 
preferential treatment. This has impelled more 
Cubans to seek a land route to the US.251 
3.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
THE COMPARATIVE COUNTRY 
EXPERIENCES
It is important to start by taking note that in the 
cases of Spain, Tunisia and the US, the examples 
of extraterritorial asylum processing and migration 
management seem to have been introduced as 
measures to prevent the arrival of asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants as a reaction to ‘crises’. This was 
the case with the Spanish Migrant Reception Centre 
in Nouadhibou (Mauritania) (following the 2005–06 
cayuco crisis), the Tunisian camps at the border with 
Libya (following the migratory flows from Libya after 
the Tunisian and Libyan revolutions in 2011), and 
the migrant interdiction activities of the US at sea 
and in-country asylum processing centres in Haiti, 
Cuba and Central America (following the increased 
flows of Haitian, Cubans and Central American 
minors). Australia stands in splendid isolation as 
the paradigmatic case of formally and consistently 
implementing offshoring of asylum and pushbacks 
at sea as key features characterising its entire asylum 
and migration management policy.
A key concern common to these four country 
experiences is the lack of clarity and publicly 
available information regarding the objectives of the 
measures, their implementation and their results. 
Their public policy objectives are not always clearly 
stipulated in publicly accessible and transparent 
legislation. While each country study presents its 
own specificities, concerning both the kinds of 
extraterritorial measures/practices implemented and 
the forms of cross-border irregular movement in each 
geographical area, none of them show irrefutable 
evidence of ‘effectiveness’ in reducing the number of 
irregular entries.
Even the few existing data presented in section 2 do 
not allow us to reach a conclusion about effectiveness 
in reducing the number of irregular entries. The 
full picture of factors playing a role in changes to 
the number of entries is often not attributable to a 
specific extraterritorial policy. Most of the examples 
under examination only lasted for a concrete period 
or a limited number of years. Little is often known 
about what actually happened to those whose 
applications for international protection received a 
negative decision.
The Australian example demonstrates that any 
recorded changes in irregular flows to Australia have 
been in line with the global trends. The case of the 
US illustrates that the number of arrivals of young 
people from Central American countries remains 
high. Similarly, as described in section 2.2, while 
Spain’s incremental border-control responses in 
cooperation with African countries led to a decrease 
in the volume of arrivals via the West African route, 
this might have caused a diversion of human mobility 
to other African routes, with many people being 
‘trapped’ in North African countries like Morocco 
and Libya. As argued by Godenau and López Sala,252  
the reduction of arrivals on Spanish soil does not 
mean that they are not happening elsewhere. Thus, 
the question remains to be answered: Were these 
measures effective in reducing a given route and 
mode of entry, or were their effects more generic in 
the sense of reducing potential irregular migration to 
the EU as a whole?
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Another feature of these examples is that 
extraterritorial arrangements and instruments tend 
to be developed outside the reach of national and 
international institutions (supervisory bodies, and 
specifically courts) designed to provide venues to 
scrutinise the actions and responsibilities of states 
in light of international human rights standards 
and commitments. Some of these extraterritorial 
instruments are often framed and implemented 
‘outside the law’ or have an extra-legal nature as part 
of an implicit or explicit strategy to evade or shift legal 
and fundamental rights responsibilities.253 
The clearest example of this is the US, where 
the US Supreme Court ruled (in Sale v Haitian 
Centers Council) that US national and international 
legal obligations, including the principle of 
non-refoulement, were restricted to actions taken 
on US territory. The US Supreme Court thereby 
legitimised the interdictions at sea and forced 
repatriations, regardless of potential refoulement or 
risk of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
of asylum seekers. The Australian Pacific Plans 
and Operation Sovereign Borders also exemplify 
this approach, with the establishment of regional 
processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, 
and the ‘outsourcing’ of the management of these 
centres to inter alia private parties.
The evasion and shifting of responsibility is closely 
interlinked with another commonality among the 
four case studies examined in section 2 of this report. 
Namely the involvement, if not reliance, on third 
countries, international organisations and private 
parties in the management and provision of service 
in the places of extraterritorial asylum processing. In 
the Spanish case, the multi-layered approach to the 
containment of irregular flows has seen the signature 
of a number of bilateral agreements between 
Spain and African countries (including Morocco, 
Mauritania and Senegal), specifically in respect of 
the readmission/return of irregular migrants. Many 
authors have noted the secretive nature of these 
bilateral agreements, which undermines and escapes 
proper democratic accountability.254 
The Australian approach to the extraterritorialisation 
of asylum processing involved MoUs with the third 
countries concerned, i.e. Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea. The involvement of the UNHCR and IOM, 
among other international organisations, is also 
prevalent in the examples of extraterritorialisation 
examined. The most prominent example of the IOM 
and UNHCR’s involvement is in Tunisia, where the 
UNHCR provided humanitarian support and refugee 
status determination at the various camps (notably 
the Choucha camp, managed by the UNHCR), while 
the IOM played an important role in carrying out 
voluntary repatriation.
The examples in section 2 demonstrate that well-
documented fundamental rights violations and 
challenges emerge in all the countries covered during 
the various phases of implementation, particularly 
those engaging in the formal offshoring of asylum. A 
critical consideration in refugee law is that refugees 
usually cannot apply for asylum abroad while 
they are still in their own State, as they are at risk 
of persecution and are normally fleeing from the 
authorities of their country. The establishment of 
asylum processing centres in Haiti, Cuba and Central 
America, coupled with the interception and forced 
repatriation of Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers 
intercepted at sea, clearly force asylum seekers to 
apply for asylum or other forms of international 
protection while remaining in fear of torture or 
violence in their country of origin. The example of the 
Choucha camp, though technically in the territory of 
Tunisia, also revealed security issues at the camps in 
light of their proximity to the Libyan border.
Furthermore, the countries under investigation 
provide evidence that the principle of non-refoulement 
has been violated, sometimes systematically. The 
Australian OSB, with its tow-back and takeback 
policies, raises concerns about direct and indirect 
refoulement. In fact, a number of Australian incidents, 
including the Minasa Bone incident in 2003, provided 
evidence of direct refoulement, and may even have 
led to chain-refoulement. Likewise, the Spanish–
Mauritania cooperation to intercept and return 
irregular arrivals to Mali and Senegal raises concerns 
about refoulement. The US migrant interdiction 
operations and forced repatriation of Haitians and 
Cubans caught at sea to Haiti and Cuba, coupled 
with the return of ‘rejected asylum seekers’ after 
cursory on-board screening, are clear examples of 
refoulement.
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Arbitrary arrests and indefinite detention under 
inhuman and degrading conditions are common 
practices in these programmes. These practices 
represent a direct threat to human dignity, the 
right to leave one’s own country as well as the 
right to liberty and security. This is most patently 
demonstrated by the Australian case and confirmed 
by the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 
Papua New Guinea (in Naham v State of PNG), which 
declared that the detention of asylum seekers in the 
RPC on Manus Island was unlawful. Even in cases 
where extraterritorial processing takes the form 
of ‘reception centres’ that may not be ‘closed’ or 
where people have not stayed for long periods, such 
as the Migration Reception Centre in Nouadhibou 
(Spain–Mauritania), these centres have provided 
extraordinarily poor reception conditions for the 
inhabitants, without access to legal assistance or any 
independent judicial control.
Procedural unfairness is a recurring problem 
throughout these kinds of extraterritorial practices, 
chiefly in cases such as the one studied in Australia. A 
shared characteristic is that extraterritorial initiatives 
present acute challenges from the perspective 
of access to effective remedies in terms of (the lack 
of ) independent review and/or judicial scrutiny 
in cases of negative decisions on applications for 
international protection or on entry and residence 
rights. Even where some form of review is foreseen, 
such as in the US CAM programme and in the 
UNHCR-managed Choucha camp, the independence 
of the review procedure or the lack of involvement of 
judicial scrutiny stand in the way of access to effective 
remedies. The lack of ‘safety’ for asylum seekers in 
the third countries involved makes access to justice, 
international protection and durable solutions 
undeliverable in practice.
Initiatives such as the Choucha camp in Tunisia have 
demonstrated how extraterritorial asylum centres – 
despite not falling within the notion of ‘offshoring’ 
used in this report – pose significant obstacles, even 
to international organisations with long-standing 
expertise like the UNHCR, to duly deliver its 
own refugee status determination procedures, in 
particular accessibility, the right of appeal and due 
process. In the example of the Choucha camp, asylum 
seekers were not always properly informed of their 
right to appeal, nor could the ‘appeal procedures’ be 
considered impartial or independent, as they were 
conducted by the same UNHCR employees involved 
in the examination in the first instance.
This lack of procedural fairness has proved to be 
problematic in cases of extraterritorial border 
surveillance and interceptions at sea, such as the 
US interception practices at sea by the US Coast 
Guard. As explained in section 2.4, this US practice 
has involved carrying out thousands of shipboard 
interrogations255  as well as those at the naval base 
in Guantánamo, which have taken place “under 
extremely taxing physical conditions, in the absence 
of legal advice, without an impartial decision-maker 
and without access to review of negative decisions”.
Shipboard screenings and other hastily conducted 
interviews in cramped and uncomfortable 
surroundings signal an unsatisfactory plan. When 
individuals have insufficient time and psychological 
support in which to prepare and convey a narrative 
of complex events, the process will be deficient. 
The lack of adequately trained asylum interviewers 
and absence of accommodation for language and 
other communication obstacles will lead to a shoddy 
system. Such screenings are oppressive and likely to 
result in inaccurate and unreliable decisions. They 
should never be a model for offshore processing.
Furthermore, despite a guarded hope for 
constructing fair offshore systems in the context 
of the US in-country refugee determination 
programmes in the Americas, major human rights 
concerns abound. More specifically, it will be crucial 
to determine whether asylum seekers can truly 
access an asylum process located in the land in 
which they fear persecution and violence. The three 
US experiments do not provide an answer to this 
dilemma.
Another common feature of the examples of 
extraterritorial asylum processing and migration 
management of the four countries examined is the 
nature of the centres as ‘closed’ detention facilities. 
The Australian example of offshoring asylum (i.e. in 
the RPCs in Nauru and Papua New Guinea) or the US 
examples on some Caribbean islands demonstrate 
that, irrespective of the original public intended 
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goal of the measures at hand, extraterritorial asylum 
and migration practices taking the form of ‘centres’ 
have a tendency to be or be converted into places 
of closed ‘detention’ (rather than ‘processing’). 
These often entail unacceptable and inhuman 
reception conditions, and are usually conflated (or 
blurred) with wider practices of border controls and 
surveillance.
This is especially the case for the Spanish example, 
where the Nouadhibou centre essentially functioned 
as a detention or internment centre for irregular 
migrants returned from Spain or detained in 
Mauritania. The setting-up of the Nouadhibou centre 
also raised important concerns. First, detention and 
deportation were neither regulated by law nor subject 
to any control by the judicial authorities. Second, 
there were denouncements of arbitrary arrests 
carried out without relevant court orders and even 
when documentation was in order. Cases of abuse, 
theft and extortion at the time of the detention were 
also well documented. Third, the centre did not meet 
minimal living standards, with overcrowding and 
poor hygiene conditions. Finally, there remains a lack 
of clarity about the centre’s current situation: while 
some assume it is closed, there is no clear evidence 
that proves it.
The Spanish example of the Nouadhibou centre 
in Mauritania further denotes a worrying 
consequence of extraterritorial asylum processing 
and migration management policies. This concerns 
the developments towards the ‘criminalisation of 
migration’ in the third countries, often in opposition 
to previous practices. As noted in section 2.2, the 
signature of the agreement between Spain and 
Mauritania led to an increased focus on ‘irregularity’ 
in Mauritania’s migration policy, which hitherto had 
largely been absent.
4.  THE FEASIBILITY OF OFFSHORING 
ASYLUM IN THE EU CONTEXT
The EU is a special supranational entity. The raison 
d’être of the Union since its inception has been 
to move beyond national closure and isolation. 
Based on past historical mistakes and human 
rights violations during war periods in Europe, 
regulatory frameworks of the Council of Europe 
and the EU have been designed and developed so 
as to offer international and (in the case of the EU) 
supranational venues of protection to individuals, 
irrespective of their migration status. They aim at 
guaranteeing people’s rights and liberties when their 
states fail to do so by not upholding democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights principles, which 
are in turn founding values for EU membership in the 
EU Treaties.
Actions and inactions by EU Member States’ 
authorities, and those of the EU and its agencies, are 
first subject to the domestic and EU constitutional 
standards – judicial, democratic and legal/financial 
scrutiny. The acceptance by Member States’ 
constitutional courts of the supremacy of EU law 
relies heavily on the daily compliance with these 
same democratic rule of law and fundamental rights 
standards by the EU in all its activities, including 
those outside the Schengen territory or in cooperation 
with third countries. They are also under the scrutiny 
of EU supranational checks and balances, and the 
legally binding and parallel application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR).
The material and personal scope of application of 
the EU CFR aims at guaranteeing that the notion 
of ‘responsibility’ in the EU legal system follows a 
‘functional’ or ‘parallel’ approach.256  Compliance 
with the EU CFR must be upheld irrespective of 
‘where’ and under ‘whose control’ actions effectively 
take place, and irrespective of any territorial 
connection with the EU. This falls under what can be 
denominated as ‘portable responsibility’, which runs 
in parallel with the traditional notion of human rights 
jurisdiction in the scope of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) (see Appendix II of this 
report for a detailed explanation). This remains the 
case even where EU law leaves discretion or margin 
of appreciation to Member States in the phases of 
implementation. That discretion must be exercised 
in light of the EU CFR and their commitments in the 
Treaties, which is equally essential when the EU goes 
abroad.
The challenges identified and the lessons learned 
from Australia, Spain/Mauritania, Tunisia and the 
US, when applied within the EU context, would 
pose significant feasibility issues for any initiatives 
for the extraterritorial asylum processing by the 
EU or its Member States. A first key challenge is 
in light of ‘whose asylum law’ that assessment 
would take place. Would the rules of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) on qualification 
and procedures also apply to these extraterritorial 
practices? Taken in the negative, extraterritorial 
processing would face the risk of being an unlawful 
attempt to get around European asylum law on the 
processing of asylum applications.257  Reliance on the 
asylum laws of cooperating third countries has been 
demonstrated to be particularly problematic in the 
case studies under analysis in this report, even more 
so when a proper asylum system and procedural 
guarantees have not been established in these third 
countries or are only on ‘paper’ but not effectively 
delivered in daily practice.
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Another challenge inherent to extraterritorial 
asylum policies in the EU context concerns the 
measures commonly associated with examples of 
offshore asylum processing, i.e. those focused on 
the prevention of irregular arrivals at sea and their 
direct incompatibility with human rights standards. 
As studied in section 2, common among the four 
countries examined are the preventive measures in 
the form of interceptions at sea and repatriation/
return. EU standards are clear in this respect: 
interceptions at sea and the ‘pushbacks’ by Member 
States and/or EU agencies in international waters or 
territorial waters of third countries are simply illegal 
and would amount to a human rights violation. EU 
agencies and Member States applying pushbacks 
cannot escape their extraterritorial jurisdiction 
when there is de facto or de jure control,258  as 
demonstrated by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the 2013 case Hirsi Jamaa and others v 
Italy.259 
The concept of ‘portable responsibility’ in the EU 
entails that, whenever Member States cooperate 
– directly or even indirectly through the provision 
or ‘support’ of tools, funding or ‘training’)260  – 
with third-country authorities in asylum as well as 
migration management, they are equally subject to 
the lawfulness test in light of the Treaties and EU 
acquis irrespective of the actual degree of direct 
control. The specificities of the EU’s legal framework 
and institutional setting would require that any kind 
of intervention impacting individuals – including 
training, capacity building and funding – would 
be assessed against the EU’s fundamental rights 
and rule of law benchmarks and would need to be 
democratically accountable.
The FRA has rightly emphasised that “state 
responsibility may exceptionally arise when a 
state aids, assists, directs and controls or coerces 
another state to engage in a conduct that violates 
international obligations”.261  Even in the case where 
financial and/or technical “aid or assistance” by an 
EU Member State or an EU agency to a third country 
may not qualify as ‘exercising effective control’ for 
purposes of applying the Hirsi judgment benchmark, 
they could be still responsible in light of the EU 
CFR. The International Law Commission Articles 
of State Responsibility has expressly acknowledged 
that an EU country could be held responsible if 
the assistance would have consciously facilitated 
“internationally wrong acts” (e.g. human rights 
violations) by the third country concerned.262 
The notion of portable responsibility covers 
examples such as the EU Trust Fund for Africa being 
used by the Italian Ministry of the Interior to enhance 
the Libyan Coast Guard’s capabilities to carry out 
search and rescue operations and thus increasingly 
contributing to ‘integrated border management’.263  
Around €46.3 million out of the EU Trust Fund 
for Africa’s North of Africa Window (around 
€237 million) has been directly used to “support 
both Libyan coast guards (under the Ministry of 
Interior and under the Ministry of Defence) in the 
form of training, including on human rights, and 
equipment”.264 
Such support, compounded by the recent registration 
of an expanded Libyan search and rescue area,265  has 
led to more interceptions by the Libyan Coast Guard, 
which are de facto pushbacks at sea and fall within 
the EU concept of ‘border surveillance’ in light of the 
2016 Schengen Borders Code.
The question is not only one of determining the 
extraterritorial application of fundamental rights 
or ascertaining the actual existence or degree of 
‘control’ and ‘authority’. It is rather the extent to 
which the kinds of activities (operational support, 
training, funding or equipment) or inactivity (in the 
search and rescue zone of the EU’s Member States) 
fall within the scope of EU law or an ‘autonomous EU 
law concept’ provided in the EU borders, asylum and 
visa acquis, such as that of ‘border surveillance’.266 
Another cross-cutting challenge among the four 
countries examined in this report is the responsibility 
over the reception conditions within extraterritorial 
processing centres. None of the past or current 
extraterritorial processing centres manage to provide 
for the standards required in light of international 
legal obligations, including the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment, and the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention. In other words, 
the right to liberty was disregarded in all four case 
studies.
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The example of the UNHCR’s contribution in 
Tunisia is emblematic in demonstrating that any 
kind of extraterritorial centre, even when not 
engaging in extraterritorial processing, entails 
fundamental difficulties in terms of practical 
operability. Extraterritorial initiatives quickly become 
unmanageable creatures for the third-country 
governments or international organisations involved, 
with huge potential for profoundly undermining 
the legitimacy and credibility of both the third 
country and the international organisation. Within 
the current Libyan context, EU funding for the IOM 
and UNHCR in providing assistance to refugees 
and vulnerable migrants has often been used to 
justify or to claim that it is reducing the negative 
human rights impacts following extraterritorial 
border management practices in that country.267  
International organisations must remain alert so 
as not to be captured by various political interests 
to offshore the responsibilities of the EU and 
its Member States and to avoid being seen as 
‘implementers’ legitimising these unlawful practices.
Any attempts at extraterritorial asylum processing 
within the EU context would pose significant 
difficulties in ensuring a ‘fair asylum procedure’. 
Procedural deficits emerging in existing 
extraterritorial practices include, among others, 
the lack of legal representation, the lack of or 
uncertainties in respect of access to a review of 
negative decisions, the lack of interpretation, and 
lack of a reasoned decision in case of a negative 
decision. Extraterritorial arrangements in third 
countries rely heavily on the adequacy of the 
legal system and guarantees available in the third 
countries concerned to provide access to asylum 
procedures and procedural guarantees to asylum 
seekers. This reliance on third countries has proven 
problematic, if not impossible in practice. Even 
where procedures and some standards may be 
available, these are not always compatible with or 
‘equivalent’ to human rights and EU standards and 
therefore able to ensure ‘safety’ for asylum seekers 
and refugees.
The deficiencies identified in the implementation 
and practical operability of instances of 
extraterritorial asylum processing have usually led 
individuals to lose trust in these systems and the 
procedures put in place for them to make it ‘legally’ 
to their desired destinations. In some of the country 
examples under examination in section 2 of this 
report, migrants and asylum seekers did not know 
for how long they would be living in or detained in 
the facilities set up in third countries and were often 
imprisoned against their will. They also lacked proper 
and accurate information about their prospects 
and future. These findings amount to a direct 
contravention of ECHR and EU Charter provisions 
on deprivation of liberty and constitute unlawful 
detention. If processing centres are ‘open’, there are 
very few incentives for individuals to stay if they 
know that their applications will not be adjudicated 
positively and fairly.
The agency of the individual on ‘where to go’ also 
seems to be completely disregarded in all the 
extraterritorial mechanisms assessed in this report. 
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the lack 
of any preference-matching system can be expected 
to have contributed to the ineffectiveness of a 
majority of the extraterritorial asylum and migration 
experiences. When those preferences are not met, 
or when mistrust in the foreseen system prevails, 
individuals tend to look for other alternatives, 
including irregular means (such as having recourse 
to migrant smugglers) to reach their desired 
destinations.
Many of those measures that started as ‘emergency’ 
responses create a trend of exceptionalism, which 
then becomes a new ‘normal’ within the EU.268  The 
extra-legal nature of most extraterritorial practices 
and mechanisms studied in this report provides 
fertile ground for damaging the integrity of any 
of these and future systems. These are practices 
particularly vulnerable to corruption, fraud and 
clientelism during the continuum of implementation. 
This is especially the case in respect of the precise 
ways in which lists of beneficiaries are managed or 
handled in third countries, and regarding who gets 
to decide who has the opportunity to legally enter 
the country of final destination. The increasing 
privatisation and involvement of companies 
contracted to carry out the ‘management’ of 
extraterritorial facilitates gives rise to ever-increasing 
concerns about financial accountability and 
transparency.
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This may become a critical issue in respect of 
instances where the EU is channelling funding to 
‘support’ third countries in extraterritorial asylum 
processing and migration management. ‘Emergency 
funding’ is often symptomatic of a political choice 
favouring extraterritoriality in ways escaping 
proper democratic, legal, and judicial scrutiny and 
accountability. It is crucial to ensure that any activities 
and initiatives that the EU funds abroad are fully 
consistent with EU legal standards and offer clear 
EU added value in line with the EU Treaties and 
Better Regulation Guidelines.269  EU funding must be 
carefully followed up and scrutinised by the European 
Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsperson.
It is questionable whether the extraterritorialisation 
of asylum processing in the EU context would be 
‘effective’ in achieving the intended goals, whether 
publicly stated or not. None of the four examples 
studied in this report have provided any conclusive 
evidence that the extraterritorial policies have led 
to a reduction of irregular movement. Even where a 
significant reduction in people intercepted at sea has 
been identified (as was the case for US extraterritorial 
policies towards Cuban nationals), it is not possible 
to clearly distinguish the independent impact of the 
extraterritorial asylum policies from other measures, 
including channels of legal entry for migrants.
When Member States go abroad, EU law does not 
allow them to incur legal and fundamental rights 
violations that would not be permissible ‘inside’ 
the EU. This means that any current or new policy 
initiative pertaining to the extraterritorial reach of 
asylum and migration policies must be compatible 
with and must be read in light of the current state 
of the EU asylum, borders and visa acquis. This also 
includes the activities of EU agencies. Appendix II 
of this report shows how Frontex and the European 
Asylum Support Office can be seen as additional 
spheres of responsibility of EU Member States’ 
actions concerning borders and asylum. Irrespective 
of whether these EU agencies’ mandate is to ‘support’ 
or ‘coordinate’ EU Member States’ activities, their 
role and increasingly operational tasks bring them 
to the heart of third-party responsibility sharing and 
potential liabilities in cases of fundamental rights 
violations.
The responsibility of these agencies to respect EU 
law and fundamental rights has increasingly been 
acknowledged in their mandates, which include 
express legal obligations for them to comply with 
EU law and fundamental rights in their actions or 
operations in cooperation with (or in the territory of ) 
third countries. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union has been conferred the competence in the 
Treaties to judicially control the activities of these EU 
agencies, and their mandates now include ‘complaint 
mechanisms’ for handling alleged fundamental 
rights violations during their operational activities on 
the ground.
5.  CONCLUSIONS: 
PORTABLE RESPONSIBILITY 
IN ACTION
This report identifies a number of standards and 
rights with profound repercussions for responsibility 
sharing, all of which are closely related to offshoring 
asylum applications and the extraterritorialisation of 
migration (border) management from the perspective 
of the EU. A key feature of the EU’s legal system is 
‘portable responsibility’. EU legal and fundamental 
rights standards must be upheld by all EU Member 
States and agencies when they engage in asylum and 
border processing abroad. The scope of the EU CFR 
encompasses every action or inaction falling directly 
or indirectly within the scope of EU law.
Our examination of past and current instances of 
offshoring asylum by Australia and the US reveals 
that a similar model would pose extensive legal, 
practical, political and fundamental rights challenges 
if it were adopted and put into practice by the EU. 
This conclusion holds both in terms of the model’s 
effectiveness in achieving its publicly stated goals 
and also with respect to its compliance with the 
European framework for fundamental rights.
Offshore programmes and practices are directly 
incompatible with the standards of the EU and 
Council of Europe. They would amount to legal 
responsibility for EU and Member States’ authorities. 
Any idea related to extraterritorial asylum processing 
would fall within the areas where the EU has 
exercised legal competence or where the existing 
‘internal’ EU standards and acquis travel abroad. 
Irrespective of the actual form that extraterritoriality 
might adopt, it would be subject to EU scrutiny and 
subject to EU legal benchmarks. Doing otherwise 
would mean reversing Europeanisation in these 
domains and would therefore be a direct violation 
of the Member States’ commitments, to which they 
have ascribed themselves under the EU Treaties, 
chiefly the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation 
enshrined in the Treaties.
The parallel application of the concept of portable 
responsibility in the EU context plays an essential 
role in any extraterritorial actions of the EU, its 
agencies and the EU Member States implementing 
EU law. Our examination proves that the actions 
of the EU and its Member States abroad and/or 
inactions within the scope of EU law, or trying to 
evade it altogether, fall to varying degrees under 
EU and domestic judicial, administrative and 
financial accountabilities which, when effective 
and accessible, have the potential to bring ‘portable 
justice’.270  In this way, this report contributes to and 
suggests ways forward in “creative legal thinking”271  
to close the legal loopholes inherent in extraterritorial 
asylum processing and migration management.
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Figure 8 provides a visual representation of the main 
components of portable responsibility and remedies 
to guarantee portable justice in the EU legal system. 
Judicial accountability, as guaranteed by the EU 
CFR in the form of the right to an effective remedy 
and to a fair trial (Article 47 EU CFR), involves the 
judicial scrutiny of inter alia extraterritorial acts 
falling under EU law by domestic courts and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
Administrative responsibility, which covers chiefly the 
right to good administration (enshrined in Article 41 
EU CFR), is overseen by actors such as the European 
Ombudsman, national ombudspersons and other 
human rights bodies. Financial accountability – 
including inter alia the legality and sound financial 
management (integrity) of the EU’s budget – is 
guaranteed, among others, by the European Court of 
Auditors and domestic courts of auditors (or similar 
bodies).
FIGURE 8.  
The main components of portable responsibility and portable justice
PORTABLE RESPONSIBILITY
PORTABLE JUSTICE
ACCOUNTABILITY
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCIAL
Court of Justice of the 
EU / domestic courts
Judicial review Opinion & complaint 
mechanisms
Audit
European Ombudsman / 
national ombudspersons
European Court of Auditors / 
national courts of auditors
Source: Own elaboration.
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Each of these layers of responsibility and 
accountability provides venues and sites of 
resistance for individuals, human rights lawyers 
and civil society actors to seek effective remedies 
against unlawful actions and policies undermining 
human rights. Appendix II of this report shows how 
the various layers of portable responsibility apply 
irrespective of the actual nature, scope or territorial 
application of the action under scrutiny, whether 
legal, political or financial. They nonetheless rely 
on the effectiveness and independence of the judicial 
remedies, complaint (administrative or extrajudicial) 
mechanisms,272  and monitoring systems and bodies 
at domestic and EU levels.
The combination of the three pillars of portable 
responsibility provide a multi-actor landscape of 
venues for seeking remedies with great potential 
for delivering portable justice. They have been 
designed to ensure that the EU’s norms, standards 
and fundamental rights are upheld by the EU, 
its agencies and EU Member States, regardless 
of territoriality or degree of control. The current 
challenge is how to make them effective in practice 
and deliver justice and protection for those in need in 
light of international, regional and EU human rights 
commitments.
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APPENDIX I.  
US CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
FIGURE AI.1  
US overseas refugee processing
Sources: Martin et al. (2013), op. cit., pp. 896-906; D.A. Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New Era of 
Refugee Resettlement, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC (2005), pp. 67-68.
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FIGURE AI.2 
US Refugee Admissions Program: Central American Minors flowchart
Source: US Department of State, Refugee Processing Center, CAM Flowchart (January 2015) (http://www.wrapsnet.org/cam-program/).
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TABLE AI.1 
US Coast Guard migrant interdictions by nationality of alien (full data)
YEARS HAITI
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC
CHINA CUBA MEXICO ECUADOR OTHER
1982 171 0 0 0 0 0 0
1983 511 6 0 44 0 0 5
1984 1,581 181 0 7 2 0 37
1985 3,721 113 12 51 0 0 177
1986 3,422 189 11 28 1 0 74
1987 2,866 40 0 46 1 0 38
1988 4,262 254 0 60 11 0 13
1989 4,902 664 5 257 30 0 5
1990 871 1,426 0 443 1 0 95
1991 2,065 1,007 138 1,722 0 0 58
1992 37,618 588 181 2,066 0 0 174
1993 4,270 873 2,511 2,882 0 0 48
1994 25,302 232 291 38,560 0 0 58
1995 909 3,388 509 525 0 0 36
1996 2,295 6,273 61 411 0 2 38
1997 288 1,200 240 421 0 0 45
1998 1,369 1,097 212 903 30 0 37
1999 1,039 583 1,092 1,619 171 298 24
2000 1,113 499 261 1,000 49 1,244 44
2001 1,391 659 53 777 17 1,020 31
2002 1,486 177 80 666 32 1,608 55
2003 2,013 1,748 15 1,555 0 703 34
2004 3,229 5,014 68 1,225 86 1,189 88
2005 1,850 3,612 32 2,712 55 1,149 45
2006 1,198 3,011 31 2,810 52 693 91
2007 1,610 1,469 73 2,868 26 125 167
2008 1,582 688 1 2,99 47 220 65
2009 1,782 727 35 799 77 6 41
Source: US Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions by Nationality of Aliens, Table 532, available at the US 
Census Bureau website (http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2010/compendia/statab/130ed/tables/11s0532.xls).
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AII.1  PORTABLE RESPONSIBILITY 
IN EU LAW AND THE 
ROLE OF REGIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
The legal framework in which the EU’s actions in 
the area of asylum and migration management are 
situated is well developed and multi-layered. To 
understand the EU legal framework, norms and 
standards that must be respected in EU action in the 
field of asylum and migration, it is essential to note 
the interrelationship between the EU acquis itself, 
the standards in regional human rights law (i.e. the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
jurisprudence), and relevant norms and standards 
flowing from international (human rights) law, such 
as those developed under the remits of the UN.
A specificity of EU law, in comparison with these 
regional and international standard-setting venues, 
is the existence of a ‘functional approach’ to the 
applicability of EU law and fundamental rights in 
cases of extraterritorial policies and practices. This 
entails that acts of EU institutions, bodies, agencies 
and offices, as well as acts of EU Member States in 
the scope of EU law, are covered by the norms and 
standards set out in the EU acquis, the Treaties and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR). 
In other words, the applicability of EU norms and 
standards ‘abroad’ is sufficiently determined by 
whether the issue falls within the scope of EU law. In 
fact, this is clearly set forth, for example, regarding 
the applicability of EU fundamental rights standards 
in Article 51 EU CFR. EU constitutional standards 
therefore run in parallel with actions or inactions of 
Member States and EU actors when these fall under 
the remits of EU law.274 
EU standards are different from the applicability 
of, for instance, the human rights standards set 
forth in the ECHR. The applicability of the ECHR is 
contingent on Article 1 ECHR, which states that “the 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention”. The 
ECtHR has, on a number of occasions, interpreted 
this provision to include certain instances of the 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, especially 
where the state concerned exercises effective control 
of an area outside its national territory.275  In the case 
of Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, the ECtHR ruled 
that – in the context of the “pushback operations” 
by the Italian armed forces – Italy had assumed both 
continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control 
over the applicants.276 
Costello identifies three relevant scenarios under 
which the ECtHR would consider the activities of 
a State Party to fall within its de facto jurisdiction: 
first, where a State exercises control over a territory; 
second, where the State exercises control over 
people, and third, based on “a combination of the 
territorial and personal factors and a background 
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exercise of public powers”.277  More recently, the 
ECtHR has confirmed its doctrine of Hirsi on de jure 
and de facto control in respect of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in N.D. and N.T. v Spain.278  In the 
latter case, concerning the operational border-
control practices by Spanish authorities in Melilla 
(as discussed in section 2.2), the Strasbourg Court 
reiterated that the Hirsi doctrine would be applicable 
to the case studies on extraterritorial border 
management, mentioned above (see section 4).
The functional approach to the applicability of EU 
law escapes from the shackles of having to determine 
de jure or de facto control. The ‘portable justice’ 
approach characterising the notion of fundamental 
rights jurisdiction in EU law therefore allows for a 
more liberal applicability of norms and standards 
to the actions of the EU (and its Member States 
and agencies) in respect of the extraterritoriality 
of asylum processing and migration management. 
The ECHR and the case law of the Strasbourg Court 
relate to EU norms and standards in another manner.
Article 52(1) of the EU CFR states that “in so far as 
this Charter contains rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the [ECHR], the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the [ECHR]. This provision shall not prevent 
Union law providing more extensive protection.” 
In other words, the scope of EU fundamental rights 
applicable to the extraterritorial processing of asylum 
and migration management are at least at the same 
level as those offered by the ECHR. Nevertheless, the 
ECHR cannot address the issues related to the EU’s 
specificities or the activities of the EU’s Justice and 
Home Affairs agencies.
FIGURE AII.1 
Determining jurisdiction and responsibility: Council of Europe (de jure and de facto control) vs EU 
(functional approach/portable responsibility)
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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The very foundations of the EU acquis in the area of 
asylum and migration (primary EU law) are, first and 
most importantly, the EU Treaties and the EU CFR. 
Unlike other international jurisdictions, this is the 
first point of entry in any standard-setting exercise 
applying to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the areas 
of asylum, migration and borders in the EU. In the 
EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the EU 
is committed to “frame[ing] a common policy on 
asylum, immigration and external border control, 
based on solidary between Member States, which 
is fair towards third-country nationals”.279  For 
migration or rather border management, this entails 
developing a policy with a view to “carrying out 
checks on persons and effective monitoring of the 
crossing of external borders” (border management) 
as well as to “develop a common immigration 
policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient 
management of migration flows [and] fair treatment 
of third-country nationals residing legally in Member 
States” (immigration policy).280  For asylum policies, 
the EU Treaties prescribe the establishment of 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), 
in accordance with inter alia the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Full compliance 
with both the Convention and the Protocol are 
therefore the minimum EU benchmark in asylum 
processing, which is formally enshrined in the right 
to asylum in Article 18 of the EU CFR.
The EU CFR applies to and is legally binding on all 
European institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, 
as well as on Member States in the implementation of 
EU law (Article 51 EU CFR). A number of fundamental 
rights in the Charter are relevant in respect of (the 
extraterritorialisation of ) asylum and migration 
(border) management. These include the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, the right to liberty and security, the right 
to asylum, the prohibition of collective expulsion and 
refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy and 
to a fair trial. In respect of the rights contained in the 
EU CFR, it should be noted that the level of protection 
of the fundamental rights in the Charter may not be 
inferior to inter alia the same rights enshrined in the 
ECHR (Article 53 EU CFR).
The EU legal system, and in particular the EU CFR, 
offers a ‘human rights+’ framework for determining 
states’ responsibility in the areas of asylum, borders 
and migration management abroad falling within the 
scope of EU law and policies. The EU fundamental 
rights system provides an additional safeguard to 
the ECHR standards when assessing the lawfulness 
and feasibility of extraterritorial asylum and border 
practices, particularly in cases where the human 
rights jurisdiction cannot be sufficiently proven or 
ascertained.
Examining the EU standards in relation to border 
management that have extraterritorial implications, 
relevant secondary EU legislation includes 
primarily the Schengen Borders Code (SBC), 
which covers activities related to border controls 
and surveillance.281  The SBC prescribes a number 
of norms that are relevant for the extraterritorial 
application of migration management. Thus, 
refusal of entry into the Schengen area requires a 
“substantiated decision stating the precise reasons 
for the refusal” by “an authority empowered by 
national law”. People who have been refused entry 
into the Schengen area have the right to appeal in 
accordance with national law.
Importantly, the SBC explicitly requires Member 
States, when applying the provisions of the SBC, 
to “act in full compliance with relevant Union 
law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (‘the Charter’), relevant 
international law, including the Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 
1951 (‘the Geneva Convention’), obligations related 
to access to international protection, in particular the 
principle of non-refoulement, and fundamental rights” 
(emphasis added).282 
In respect of asylum processing abroad, relevant 
secondary legislation instruments of the CEAS 
are, among others, the Receptions Conditions 
Directive,283  and the Asylum Procedures Directive,284 
which are currently being revised and are under 
interinstitutional renegotiation. The Receptions 
Conditions Directive outlines a number of standards 
that must be respected for the reception of applicants 
for international protection, including the right to 
information and access to judicial review of the 
detention measure. The Asylum Procedures Directive 
guarantees seekers of international protection the 
right of access to the procedure and in respect of a 
decision on an asylum application rights to a ‘fair 
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procedure’, along with the right to legal assistance 
and the right to an effective remedy. Furthermore, 
both the Reception Conditions Directive and the 
Asylum Procedures Directive promote adherence to 
fundamental rights, in particular the EU CFR.285 
All of these aforementioned standards in secondary 
EU asylum law find their counterpart in the right to 
an effective remedy in the EU CFR and/or the ECHR 
(and thus indirectly also in the EU CFR).286  These 
secondary EU asylum acquis standards can therefore 
be seen as specifications of or ‘giving substance’ 
to the right to asylum and the right to an effective 
remedy under the EU CFR, notwithstanding the 
limited territorial scope of the Reception Conditions 
and the Asylum Procedures Directives.
Having briefly identified the relevant EU legal 
framework concerning the offshoring of asylum and 
extraterritorial migration (border) management, it 
is important to highlight the European human rights 
standards that are relevant to the extraterritoriality 
of asylum and migration management as set forth by 
the ECHR. The first ECHR standard relevant in this 
regard is the prohibition of torture in Article 3 ECHR. 
The Court has on numerous occasions considered 
that, notwithstanding the right of States to control 
migration, measures for that purpose may be in 
contravention of the prohibition of torture in cases of 
a breach of the non-refoulement obligation of States.287 
Another important right enshrined in the ECHR in 
respect of the extraterritorial processing of asylum 
and external migration management is the right to an 
effective remedy (Article 13 ECHR).288 
The various judgments of the ECtHR have set out 
the obligations of States concerning the right to 
a fair trial, which includes the right of access to a 
court. Regarding the right to an effective remedy, 
an example of a breach thereof can be found in Hirsi 
Jaama and others v Italy, in which the ECtHR found 
that the pushback activities of the Italian authorities 
to Libya rendered the applicants in a situation in 
which they were “deprived of any remedy which 
would have enabled them to lodge their complaints … 
with a competent authority and to obtain a thorough 
and rigorous assessment of their request”.289  Other 
important Convention rights include inter alia 
the right to liberty and security (Article 5 ECHR), 
including the right to challenge the lawfulness of 
detention in front of a court, and the right to leave 
any country (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR).
Aside from the ECHR, a number of international 
(human rights) instruments may also be referred to. 
As stated above, in relation to asylum, the clearest 
indication of the application of international law can 
be discerned from the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, which explicitly refers to the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
thereto. The 1951 Refugee Convention guarantees 
to refugees the right of access to courts and the 
prohibition of expulsion or return (refoulement). 
Further international legal instruments that are 
relevant for understanding the applicable EU 
norms and standards include, among others, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), in particular the right to leave any country 
and the right to liberty and security, as well as the UN 
Convention against Torture.
The views adopted by the Human Rights Committee 
(for the ICCPR) and the Committee against Torture 
constitute an additional source of interpretation of 
international human rights standards in inter alia the 
area of asylum and migration, and when reviewing 
EU and Member State actions or omissions abroad. 
The Human Rights Committee, for example, has 
concluded that long-term or indefinite detention of 
asylum seekers may lead to a violation of Article 9(1) 
ICCPR if the State cannot demonstrate that other, 
less intrusive measures could not have achieved 
the same result.290  The human rights provisions in 
among others the ICCPR and the Convention against 
Torture, as well as the views adopted by the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee against 
Torture, may play a role as sources of interpretation 
when determining the legality and responsibility of 
EU and Member State actors by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). The reports of these 
international bodies in their monitoring of human 
rights may potentially serve as sources of evidence in 
cases brought before the CJEU.
The fundamental rights standards set out above, 
which are applicable to the EU’s activities in the 
extraterritorial processing of asylum and migration 
management are summarised in Figure AII.2.
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FIGURE AII.2 
Legal framework on EU asylum and migration, hierarchy of EU norms and relation to international and 
regional (human rights) instruments
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AII.2 EU AGENCIES AND 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY:  
EU LEGAL STANDARDS
This section examines EU legal standards that are 
applicable to EU justice and home affairs agencies 
with mandates covering asylum and migration 
(border) management tasks, in particular regarding 
their extraterritorial operational activities. It provides 
an analysis of the legal framework or mandates 
for agencies’ cooperation with third countries, the 
set of existing legal safeguards and some potential 
feasibility challenges.
In the EU context, there are two key agencies of 
direct relevance to the current report, namely the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). 
In both cases, some kind of cooperation with third 
countries is envisaged. Despite their stated tasks of 
mainly supporting and coordinating EU Member 
State actions, previous research has shown that their 
tasks do not evade the possibility of these agencies 
being liable and judicially accountable before the 
CJEU in Luxembourg in cases of fundamental rights 
violations.291  The extended mandate of Frontex 
and the foreseen enhancement of EASO provide 
further grounds for that argument, as they include 
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a strengthened role for these agencies not only in 
capacity building, but also in operational cooperation 
and activities, including in third-country territories. 
This raises questions of state and EU responsibility 
and compliance with EU fundamental rights and 
international law standards laid down above.
AII.2.1 EASO and its cooperation 
with third countries
EASO was created in 2010 and is tasked with 
implementation of the CEAS.292  EASO provides 
the expertise along with practical, technical and 
operational support to the Member States in 
implementing their international and EU obligations 
in the area of asylum. The increase in the number 
of asylum seekers arriving in Europe since 2015 has 
made apparent the need for fairer responsibility 
sharing in asylum applications and for establishing a 
truly European asylum authority tasked with ensuring 
that the asylum acquis is properly and consistently 
applied by Member States.293  The European 
Commission presented a proposal on how the current 
EASO’s mandate could be extended and enhanced by 
creating an EU Agency on Asylum (EUAA).
The Commission’s proposal establishes that the 
key tasks of the new agency would include a central 
role in supporting and coordinating Member States’ 
cooperation with third countries “in matters related 
to asylum, in particular as regards resettlement”.294  
In addition, the proposal foresees that the EUAA 
“shall support Member States in relation to the 
external dimension of the CEAS”.295  Such support 
extends to coordinating information exchange and 
“other action taken”.296 
One of the main innovations included in the 
Commission’s proposal can be found in Article 35, 
which details and expands the reach of the agency’s 
role in fostering cooperation with third states in the 
area of asylum. The proposal provides for a central 
contribution by the EUAA to operational cooperation 
between Member States and third countries. 
Importantly, the proposal requires the EUAA, as well 
as the Member States, to act in compliance with EU 
norms and standards, including in the protection of 
fundamental rights, even when they are carrying out 
activities on the territory of third countries.
Furthermore, the proposal allows for the EUAA 
to cooperate with third countries in ‘capacity 
building’ of their asylum and reception systems 
in accordance with EU law and policy and subject 
to prior approval of the Commission. Under the 
proposal, the EUAA “may, with the agreement of 
the host Member State, invite officials from third 
countries to observe the operational and technical 
measures”. This provision has raised ethical and 
legal concerns on the part of the European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), which noted that “in 
order not to compromise an applicant’s trust in the 
asylum process and to avoid any unlawful sharing 
of information, any participation of third-country 
officials in practical cooperation activities on the 
territory of a Member State should be excluded”.297  
ECRE’s analysis also stressed the risk of external 
facets of the future agency’s work potentially 
violating the EU asylum acquis, in particular the 
principles of confidentiality and non-disclosure of 
information to third-country officials who could 
belong to a government that persecuted the person 
involved.
An additional provision in the proposed regulation 
envisages a role for the future EUAA in cooperation 
with third countries on resettlement, including 
a rather vague arrangement for exchanging 
information with these non-EU states. The EUAA 
would be obliged, under the proposed regulation, to 
participate in international agreements between the 
Union and third countries on matters pertaining to 
asylum. It is important to recall, however, that the 
much-discussed EU–Turkey Statement has been 
presented by EU institutions as not constituting an 
international agreement concluded by the Union 
but rather a political declaration.298  Yet, EASO has 
already been tasked with providing assistance in 
this case, in fast-track procedures in Greece. The 
proposal further foresees additional funding from the 
“instruments supporting the external relations policy 
of the Union”, which would allow the use of the EU 
trust funds. Interestingly, the EUAA itself could 
distribute the funding to third countries as it “may 
launch and finance technical assistance projects in 
third countries regarding matters covered by this 
Regulation”.
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The provisions covering cooperation with third 
countries are framed in a fashion that lacks 
legal clarity and certainty, providing wide room 
for interpretation. What are the standards and 
fundamental rights set out in the proposed EUAA 
regulation? Recital 24 of the Commission’s proposal 
summarises three key conditions for operational 
cooperation with third countries, which must i) be 
based on the Commission’s prior approval; ii) not 
depart from the external policies of the European 
External Action Service; iii) meet the “norms and 
standards at least equivalent to those set by Union 
legislation also when the cooperation with third 
countries takes place on the territory of those 
countries” (emphasis added).299  Thus, when the 
EUAA engages in any way with a third country, the 
EU fundamental rights framework and general 
principles of EU law should also follow. This 
functional understanding of jurisdiction corresponds 
with the one enshrined in the EU CFR.
Articles 26 and 27 of the same proposal set out the 
civil and criminal liability without mentioning third 
countries, only “third parties”. As an example, the 
proposal, in respect of civil liability, provides that 
Member States shall waive all claims against host 
Member States or any other Member State for 
damages, except in cases of gross negligence or 
wilful misconduct.300  It is not entirely clear how such 
a clause would apply if a third country were a host 
country.
In addition, whereas one of the envisaged tasks of the 
EUAA is the coordination of information exchange 
with third countries, Article 30 (which covers data 
protection) prohibits “the transfer of personal 
data processed by the Agency and the onward 
transfer by Member States to authorities of third 
countries or third parties, including international 
organisations”.301  Thus, it is not clear how any kind 
of personal data collection, for example of asylum 
applicants, could take place on the territory of a third 
country. As the European Data Protection Supervisor 
has explained in an opinion on the CEAS, there 
would be a general prohibition of data exchanges 
with third countries and data exchanges would 
happen as an exception, for example, “only the data 
strictly necessary for the purpose of return can be 
transferred by the Member States”.302  Therefore, 
as already established in the above-mentioned case 
of Hirsi, jurisdiction regarding the obligation by 
the agency to respect the EU fundamental right of 
privacy would equally follow in the area of asylum.
AII.2.2 European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (Frontex) 
cooperation with third 
countries
Frontex is another EU Justice and Home Affairs 
agency tasked with the monitoring and protection 
of the common EU external borders, and the 
implementation of the SBC. Frontex defines its own 
mission as to “coordinate and develop European 
border management in line with the EU fundamental 
rights charter and the concept of Integrated Border 
Management”.303  Besides its tasks to assist Member 
States in monitoring and border surveillance, to 
provide operational and technical support along with 
capacity building for Member State officials, it is 
foreseen that Frontex will assist in integrated border 
management, including with third countries. The EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) has elaborated 
that such assistance or cooperation comprises a 
four-tier model: i) measures in third countries (such 
as training, capacity building and the deployment of 
teams); i) cooperation with third countries (i.e. joint 
operations); iii) measures at the external borders; and 
iv) measures within EU territory, including returns.304 
In 2016, as a response to the so-called ‘EU refugee 
crisis’ and related developments in a number of 
countries to reintroduce internal border controls in 
the Schengen area of free movement, the European 
Commission proposed to enhance and extend the 
mandate of Frontex in its role of protecting external 
EU borders and proceeding faster with the returns.305  
The co-legislators, the Commission, Council and 
the European Parliament, concluded negotiations 
at the speed of light for such a process and adopted 
Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1624 of 14 September 2016 
establishing the European Border and Coast Guard 
(hereinafter: EBCG Regulation).306 
This regulation stipulates that cooperation with third 
countries is an essential component of European 
integrated border management and provides a broad 
description of countries the agency is able cooperate 
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with, including neighbouring and third countries 
that “have been identified through risk analysis as 
being countries of origin and/or transit for illegal 
immigration”. One of the tasks foreseen in the new 
regulation is to “provide technical and operational 
assistance to Member States and third countries 
in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 
[on sea operations coordinated by Frontex] and 
international law, in support of search and rescue 
operations for persons in distress at sea which may 
arise during border surveillance operations at sea”.
The EBCG Regulation (2016/1624) lays down the 
fundamental rights and the non-refoulement principle 
that must be respected when Frontex is coordinating 
sea operations. Even though reference is made to 
the regulation on sea operations, it seems that land 
operations have a lower threshold of safeguards. In 
situations at the external borders requiring ‘urgent’ 
action, the Regulation also foresees that Frontex 
will “coordinate activities for one or more Member 
States and third countries at the external borders, 
including joint operations with neighbouring third 
countries”. The operational plans are binding on the 
Agency, the host Member State and the participating 
Member States, and the plans have to cover the terms 
of cooperation with third countries as well as with 
international organisations.
Cooperation between Frontex and third countries 
must take place within the framework of the external 
relations policy of the Union, with due regard to the 
protection of fundamental rights and the principle of 
non-refoulement. The EBCG Regulation additionally 
makes explicit that Frontex and the Member States 
cooperating with third countries must comply with 
EU law, norms and standards, including where 
cooperation with third countries takes place on the 
territory of those countries.
The Regulation foresees various degrees of 
cooperation between Frontex and third countries 
– from general cooperation to deployment of 
Frontex teams onto the territory of third countries 
– with changing conditions depending on the 
level of engagement with third countries. For 
general cooperation with the border and coast 
guard authorities of third countries, the ‘working 
arrangements’ need to be concluded in accordance 
with Union law and policy. The Regulation also 
details the obligation for the Agency and Member 
States to obtain the Commission’s approval of 
‘draft arrangements’ and foresees an obligation to 
inform the European Parliament “before a working 
arrangement is concluded”.
Any kind of cooperation at the external borders with 
neighbouring third countries by Frontex is subject to 
a joint operation plan. The Regulation allows for the 
possibility of such joint operations to be deployed 
“onto the territory of [a] third country”. Member 
States may opt out of participating in such joint 
operations. The Commission shall be informed of 
such “joint operations onto the territory of [a] third 
country”, but the role of the European Parliament 
is not explicitly mentioned. The Regulation further 
anticipates the possibility for Frontex teams to be 
deployed onto the territory of a third country “in 
actions where the team members will have executive 
powers”. Such deployment requires a fully-fledged 
international agreement between the EU and the 
third country concerned. This requirement of an 
international agreement guarantees democratic 
accountability, as the European Parliament has a role 
in approving international agreements with the EU.
Despite these ‘safeguards’, the Regulation foresees 
the possibility to involve the Agency in bilateral 
agreements between a Member State and a third 
country on the conditions that i) Frontex agrees; 
ii) “the role and competence of the Agency [is] 
in accordance with this Regulation”; and iii) the 
Commission is informed. The possibility to involve 
the EU’s Agency in the implementation of bilateral 
agreements (with the exception of deploying 
teams and joint operations onto the territory of a 
third country) raises certain concerns about EU 
added value and democratic accountability, as the 
European Parliament would not be informed in a 
timely way about such a decision. While for any kind 
of cooperation with third countries Frontex is, in 
general, obliged to inform the European Parliament 
as foreseen by Article 54, no timeframe has been 
provided for this. In addition, Frontex is required 
to “include an assessment of the cooperation with 
third countries in its annual reports”. Nevertheless, 
these ‘annual’ assessments may not qualify as human 
rights impact assessments (see the next subsection).
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Despite the above-mentioned issues of responsibility, 
the EBCG Regulation foresees participation in 
relevant international agreements in the area of 
external relations of the EU, as well as the possibility 
to obtain and disburse funding to third countries 
(Article 54). As the next subsection indicates, even 
disbursing EU funding to third countries carries a set 
of responsibilities for its impact on human rights.
The EBCG Regulation defines the role of liaison 
officers who can be deployed to third countries, 
in particular those identified by a risk assessment 
as being transit or origin countries, as “part of 
the local or regional cooperation networks of 
immigration liaison officers and security experts”. 
The deployment of the officers is possible “to third 
countries in which border management practices 
comply with minimum human rights standards”, 
though it remains unclear who decides (or how 
they assess) whether these conditions are met. This 
requirement seems to preclude liaison officers from 
third countries coming on a reciprocal basis, though 
it is not obvious whether such a condition should 
preclude other forms of cooperation with the agency 
(e.g. observers from third countries coming to learn 
and participate in the activities of Frontex). This 
raises analogous issues, like ECRE raised vis-à-vis 
observers coming to the EUAA.
The deployment of Frontex liaison officers to third 
countries is subject to the prior “opinion of the 
Commission” and subsequently informing the 
European Parliament. Nonetheless, it remains 
unclear how many ‘liaison officers’ could be 
considered part of a Frontex deployed team, which 
would require a prior international agreement. This is 
especially problematic, as the Frontex liaison officers 
are tasked with “contributing to the prevention of 
and fight against illegal immigration and the return 
of returnees” (Article 55, para. 3).
When it comes to cooperating with third countries 
in return operations, the Regulation reiterates the 
obligation for Frontex to comply with the principles 
of non-refoulement, fundamental rights and 
international law in activities abroad. Various specific 
conditions must be met for the implementation 
of returns, for instance concerning the number of 
forced-return monitors, forced-return escorts and 
return specialists who should be tasked to ensure 
fundamental rights among other things. Both forced-
return monitors and escorts “shall remain subject 
to the disciplinary measures of their home Member 
State in the course of a return operation or return 
intervention”.
As with the proposed Regulation for the EUAA, 
Frontex is obliged by the EBCG Regulation to 
guarantee the protection of fundamental rights in 
all its operations and to lay down its fundamental 
rights strategy. The more relevant components of the 
fundamental rights strategy are the establishment 
of a (non-independent) complaint mechanism, a 
fundamental rights officer with an advisory role and a 
consultative forum. In respect of fundamental rights, 
the Regulation clearly states that the exchange, with 
third countries, of personal data of people rescued 
or otherwise obtained during sea operations is 
prohibited where the person could be subjected to 
the above-mentioned violations. Data protection 
issues are further reiterated in Article 45 of the EBCG 
Regulation itself.
AII.3 RESPONSIBILITY VIA EU 
FUNDING AND EU POLITICAL 
ARRANGEMENTS WITH THIRD 
COUNTRIES
Capacity-building activities at first sight might not 
look like they have a direct link to EU and Member 
State responsibilities and potential liabilities for 
fundamental rights violations. Yet when countries 
are funded from the EU budget or EU financial 
instruments, such as the EU Trust Funds, the 
European Commission would have a responsibility 
to assess the potential impact and compliance of the 
activities abroad covered by that EU funding with the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the EU CFR as part of 
the fundamental right of ‘good administration’. These 
issues are carefully followed by two independent 
EU institutions – the European Ombudsman and the 
European Court of Auditors (ECA).
The European Ombudsman cannot intervene 
in individual cases at the Member State level or 
within third countries. It has a mandate to act like a 
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watchdog to ensure that EU institutions do their best 
to ensure that fundamental rights, in particular those 
flowing from the right to good administration, are 
respected. The European Ombudsman can either 
investigate complaints or start own-initiative inquiries 
so as to intervene proactively in situations where there 
is a risk of systemic fundamental rights breaches.307 
For example, in 2015 the European Ombudsman 
concluded that “the fact that the Commission is 
not directly responsible for managing the funds 
should never be used as a reason for not acting 
if fundamental rights have been, or risk being 
violated”.308  In this case the European Ombudsman 
looked at how EU Cohesion Funds were spent, 
sometimes in clear violation of fundamental rights, 
such as funding segregated settlements for Roma 
or people with mental disabilities. Still, the analogy 
could be easily applied to EU funding going to third 
countries, for various purposes, including building 
asylum capacity or boosting their operational and 
technical capabilities for migration management, 
where human rights standards apply (recital 46):
[The] Commission should not allow itself to finance, 
with EU money, actions which are not in line with the 
highest values of the Union, that is to say, the rights, 
freedoms and principles recognised by the Charter. 
The Commission regularly subjects cooperation with 
third countries, which are not bound by the Charter, 
to a clause concerning respect for human rights. The 
standard required from Member States necessarily 
needs to be significantly higher. 309 
In January 2017, the European Ombudsman 
elaborated that EU fundamental rights standards 
should follow not only the EU’s funding, but 
also various kinds of ‘political agreements’ and 
non-legally binding deals, such as the above-
mentioned EU–Turkey Statement.310  The 
Ombudsman concluded that “neither its political 
nature, nor indeed the title ‘Agreement’ or 
‘Statement’, in any way diminish the responsibility 
of the Commission to ensure that its actions are 
in compliance with the EU’s fundamental rights 
commitments”.311  Further, the Ombudsman 
emphasised the need to conduct a human rights 
impact assessment before any kind of ‘political 
arrangement’ is made as part of the Commission’s 
responsibility for good administration, which 
analogically could be applied to EU Justice and Home 
Affairs agencies when undertaking various kinds of 
working arrangements with third countries.312  The 
role of the consultative forums could be further 
strengthened to alert and enable the Ombudsman’s 
investigations.
In the latter case, the European Ombudsman 
highlighted that current progress reports provided by 
the European Commission on the implementation 
of the EU–Turkey Statement are too general, do 
not identify human rights at risk and lack analysis 
of these issues; thus, they do not replace a proper 
impact assessment. The Ombudsman cited its earlier 
decision on the EU–Vietnam trade agreement,313  
where it explained that a proper tool for human 
rights impact assessments should identify “the 
sources of risks and the human rights impacts 
on the affected stakeholders at each stage of the 
project’s life. Its role is preventive in the first place 
because when negative impacts are identified, either 
the negotiated provisions need to be modified or 
mitigating measures have to be decided upon before 
the agreement is entered into”.314  The Ombudsman 
also clarified that such impact assessments would 
need to be systematic and conducted on a regular 
basis to identify any kinds of changes. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that fundamental rights impact 
assessments would also need to be part of any kind of 
international agreement or other ‘arrangement’, such 
as political agreements and deals to cooperate with 
third countries.
The ECA has an explicit mandate to ensure financial 
compliance and perform audits. The ECA also 
oversees whether EU institutions manage EU 
funding in light of principles of “sound financial 
management, transparency, proportionality, 
non-discrimination and equal treatment” set by 
the EU regulation on financial rules.315  The funding 
aimed at extraterritorial border management 
and/or supporting the asylum capacity of third 
countries is allocated either from the EU budget (the 
Development Cooperation Instrument, Investment 
Partnership Agreements, the Facility for Refugees 
in Turkey, etc.) or, increasingly, from instruments 
falling outside the EU budget (via the European 
Development Fund and EU Trust Funds).316 
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Nevertheless, even the ‘extra-EU budget’ 
instruments, aimed at more flexibility, need to be 
implemented in line with the general principles of 
EU funding, and hence the ECA has a role to play. 
For example, the ECA in its Special Report on the 
Bêkou Trust Fund scrutinised the extent to which the 
European Commission carried out a formal analysis 
of whether EU funding was spent in compliance 
with the EU’s financial rules. 317  Such special reports 
and their follow-ups could be requested on a regular 
basis on the EU Trust Funds aiming at extraterritorial 
migration management (for example, the EU Trust 
Fund for Africa) or when the European Border 
and Coast Guard or the new EASO distributes 
funding to third countries.318  Here again, access 
to information and involvement by the respective 
consultative forums could be crucial. In addition, 
the Ombudsman and ECA reports could be used 
in a systemic and complementary manner, as for 
example has been done when investigating whether 
the EU Cohesion Funds respected principles of 
non-discrimination of Roma people.319 
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